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1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
1.1 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this safety evaluation is to determine if the potential risk associated with using 
the single-shell tank (SST) modified sluicing system for retrieval of the 100-series SSTs in the 
tank farms is adequately addressed and bounded by the current tank farms safety basis 
(documented safety analysis [DSA]) and to determine if additional controls may be required. 
This safety evaluation also supports the requirement to perfom a generic safety basis 
amendment for the retrieval of any additional SSTs (other than 241-S-112, and 241-U-107) by 
modified sIuicing from the U.S. Department o f  Energy, Office of River Protection (OW) Safety 
Evaluation Report (SER) 03-TED-066, Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Approval of 
Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) for Tank Farms Single-Shell Tank (SSV 
RetrievalKlosure Modified Sluicing. 
1.2 SCOPE 
The scope of this safety evaluation is SST modified sluicing waste retrieval system operations 
that are planned for conduct in 100-series SSTs. Waste from the 100-series tanks is planned to 
be transferred to double-shell tank (DST) storage. Initially modified sluicing campaigns are 
planned for the 241-S, 241-C, and 241-U tank farms. This safety evaluation is based on two 
separate designs originally prepared for SSTs 2414-106 and 241-S-112; however, the design for 
these two tanks is expected to be bounding for future tanks to be modified sluiced. When the 
system designs and processes for the retrieval of these subsequent tank farms’ 100-series tanks 
are established, the analysis of this safety evaluation will be reviewed via the Unreviewed Safety 
Question process to determine whether this analysis satisfactorily bounds the retrievals from 
these subsequent tank farms. 
Revision 2 of this document adds Appendix D, which is a safety evaluation for modified sluicing 
with DST Supernatant in SST 241-S-102. 
Revision 3 of this document adds Appendix E, which is a safety evaluation for modified sluicing 
with DST Supernatant in SST 241-C-103. 
Revision 4 of this document evaluates the potential for higher than expected ventilation flow 
rates for the high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter filtration failures leading to unfiltered 
releases accident. The higher than expected ventilation flow rates were due to the re-evaluation 
of the variable frequency drives of the ventilation system. 
Revision 5 of this document adds Appendix F, which is a safety evaluation for the addition of 
sodium hydroxide to a 100-series SST in support of modified sluicing waste retrieval. 
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2.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE SINGLE-SHELL TANK MODIFIED SLUICING 
WASTE RETRIEVAL SYSTEM DESIGN AND PROCESS 
SST modified sluicing waste retrieval systems will retrieve waste kom designated tanks to the 
extent needed for tank closure and transfer the retrieved waste to the DST system. The SST 
modified sluicing waste retrieval system is designed to dissolve SST crystallized salt and to 
mobilize sludge through the application of high pressure water or supernatant spray to break 
down the waste salt, sludge, and solids and to direct the waste to the intake of a slurry transfer 
pump for transfer into the DST system. Various SST waste retrieval system sluicing designs 
may be used. Each system uses sluicing nozzles, waste transfer pump(s), monitoring and control 
systems, portable exhauster ventilation, and new and existing waste transfer systems. Support 
systems necessary for the sluicing design include raw water and electrical supply. 
The SST waste retrieval system sluicing designs employ remote controlled or automatic sluicing 
nozzles that are strategically placed and installed in the tank headspace via SST risers. The 
number of sluicing nozzles can vary depending on the amount and location of solidified waste 
within the SST. Current sluicing designs rely upon one to six sluicing nozzles. The nozzle 
system is designed to aim pressurized fluid (raw water or SST supernatant) that will break up, 
mobilize, and move the sludge, dissolved saltcake, and compacted solids slurry to a location 
where they are picked up by a slurry transfer pump. The design flow rate of the remote operated 
sluicing nozzles is variable up to approximately 100 gal/min with normal operating pressures up 
to approximately 100 lb/in2. The automatic self-indexing sluicers operate at a flow rate of 
approximately 20 gal/min. The nozzle spray range will cover a minimum range of 30 A up to a 
maximum range of approximately 75 8. The sluicers are capable of 360 degree rotation in the 
horizontal, and vertical pan and tilt from 0 degrees to 90 degrees. 
The nozzles are remotely directed from a control trailer by use of hydraulic or electric controls. 
Automatic self-indexing sluicing nozzles may also be used that do not require operator action. 
SST waste retrieval system sluicing designs use different pump configurations that could include 
one or two pumps in series for waste retrieval, with the possibility of the addition of a separate 
supernatant recirculation pump. The primary waste retrieval pump(s) are typically located near 
the center of the SST. The pump(s) are physically located within the SST or external to the tank 
in an enclosed structure, with the pump suction draw located near the tank bottom. Pump 
designs include centrifugal pumps and progressive cavity positive displacement pumps. Except 
for positive displacement pumps where higher pressures are possible, the slurry transfer pumps 
operate at flow rates and pressures bounded by existing waste transfer pumps (see 
Section 2.4.2.3 of RPP-13033). An SST supernatant recirculation pump may be used during the 
sluicing operation to provide recirculation capability to the sluicing system. The supernatant 
recirculation pump operates at a nominal 100 gal/min at 100 lb/in2. 
Dilution water may be used to aid in the retrieval process by diluting the slurry to the appropriate 
specific gravity conducive to waste transfer. Dilution water can also be supplied to flush the 
slurry transfer pump and/or the waste transfer line. Dilution water can be added at up to 
approximately 100 gal/min, with a nominal flow rate of 50 gal/min. 
2-1 
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Sodium hydroxide may also be used to help retrieve the water-insoluble solids by dissolving 
aluminum oxide compounds and suspending solids in the waste of the 100-series SSTs. Sodium 
hydroxide is delivered in vendor-owned tanker trucks and added directly to the SST. The 
sodium hydroxide is typically introduced into the SST using a pressurized tanker truck via the 
dilution drop leg on the transfer pump or into the supernatant recirculation drop leg. Sodium 
hydroxide may also be introduced via the sluice nozzles using the pressurized tanker truck in 
conjunction with a skid-mounted pump. The maximum addition rate of sodium hydroxide is 
175 galhin. A flexible hose system delivers the sodium hydroxide to the SST using a flow 
metering device to measure the amount of chemical added to the SST. See Appendix F for a 
complete safety evaluation for the addition of sodium hydroxide to a 100-series SST. 
Operators located within a control trailer direct the monitoring and control system. The control 
trailer could be located within the tank farm or nearby outside the fenced boundary. The control 
trailer contains sluicing operation controls and closed-circuit television monitors and controls. 
The sluice nozzles are remotely operated using joysticks and observed via the television 
monitors displaying the view from cameras located within the source SST. In-tank lighting is 
used to enhance in-tank camera viewing. During retrieval operations, the video cameras provide 
visual feedback on the waste mobilization process; assisting operations in the control of water or 
supernatant spray application and moving slurry to the transfer pump suction. 
Process parameters that are monitored during the sluicing process include system temperatures, 
pressures, waste temperature and density, flow rates of the system, and raw water flow and waste 
transfer volume. Liquid depth in the SST pool is also monitored. 
Active ventilation is connected to the SST to aid the sluicing operations by removing aerosols 
and/or fog generated during sluicing to enable better visual monitoring capability. The tank 
ventilation system is comprised o f  an inlet HEPA filter, a portable exhauster, and a demister. 
The portable exhauster contains a heater, pre-filter, two stages of HEPA filters, a fan, an exhaust 
stack, an effluent monitoring system, and ventilation stack continuous air monitor interlock 
system. The portable exhausters use variable speed blowers that normally operate at between 
100 ft3/min and 1,000 k' imin but have been analyzed up to 5,600 ft3/min. 
The slurry transfer pumping system is connected to either an existing underground waste transfer 
system or to a hose-in-hose transfer line (HIHTL) that is used to transfer the retrieved waste to 
the DST system. The HIHTL is heat traced and insulated. The waste transfer system includes 
required leak detection and alarm capabilities. 
The SST waste retrieval system sluicing designs use raw water and electric power. Raw water is 
provided to the sluicing nozzles and auxiliary equipment. Backflow preventers or service water 
pressure detection systems are used to assure that no contamination of the raw water supply can 
occur. Raw water supply may be heat traced and insulated as necessary. Heated water may also 
be provided. 
Electric power is used to power the operation control trailers, the portable exhausters, electric 
pump motors, raw water and waste transfer line heat tracing, and the process monitoring and 
control systems, including leak detection and alarms. Electric power is provided via connection 
to the Hanford Site power distribution system or via portable power generators. 
2-2 
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3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
SST modified sluicing waste retrieval system operations are proposed activities that have not 
been approved under the DSA; however, approval of modified sluicing waste retrieval system 
operations is approved under the final safety analysis report for SSTs 241-S-112 and 241-U-107 
via ORP SER 03-TED-066 and SST 241-C-106 via a negative Unreviewed Safety Question and 
ORP SER 03-TED-029, “Approval of Interim Authorization Using Alternate Controls Related to 
the Operation of Active Ventilation on Single-Shell Tank (SST) 241 -C-106 During Accelerated 
Waste Retrieval,” which allowed for the passive breather filter to be closed during active 
ventilation. 
A Hazards and Operability Study (HAZOP) was performed to identify and evaluate potential 
hazards associated with the SST modified sluicing waste retrieval system for 100-series SSTs 
retrieval. In addition, HAZOPs performed on SSTs 241-$112 (RPP-9014, Process Hazards 
Analysis for the 9 1  I 2  Saltcake Waste Retrieval Technology Demonstration Project 
Preconceptual Design), 241 4 - 1 0 7  (RPP-7689, Hazard Evaluation for Single-Shell Retrieval 
Via Salt Cake Dissolution Proof of Concept in Tank 241-U-107), and 241-C-106 (RPP-13557, 
Safety Evaluation of the Phase I Retrieval of Liquid Wastefiorn Single-Shell Tank 241-C-106) 
were reformatted to conform with the DSA and were added to the modified sluicing HAZOP. 
The results of the combined HAZOPs were reviewed to identify potential hazardous conditions 
associated with the modified sluicing waste retrieval system that may not be adequately bounded 
or represented by the DSA analyzed representative accidents. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
The hazards identification and evaluation of modified sluicing waste retrieval system operations 
used the HAZOP method. A HAZOP is a systematic process for identifying potential causes and 
consequences of off-normal conditions in a system or process. The M O P  uses a team leader 
to guide an interdisciplinary team of subject matter experts (Appendix A) in evaluating a system 
or process. The HAZOP process is based on “brainstorming” and uses a standardized set of 
process parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure, flow) and guide words (e.g., high, low, part of, 
reverse) to facilitate the “brainstonning.” Table 3-1 presents a list of process parameters and 
guide words. The HAZOP team also established consequence and frequency estimates for 
radiological and toxicological effects to three receptor categories. These are offsite individual, 
onsite worker, and facility worker. Each hazardous condition was evaluated using a qualitative 
estimation process, without consideration of the application of any controls. The 
definitionslcriteria for the information developed during the HAZOP process are found in 
Appendix B. 
3-1 
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The expertise and experience of the HAZOP team is o f  primary importance in establishing the 
credibility of the analysis because of the largely qualitative nature of the HAZOP process. The 
attendance roster is included in Appendix A to document the presence of each team member. 
The HAZOP process is recognized by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) 
and is described in Guidelines for Hazard Evuluation Procedures (AIChE 1992). 
One of the important features of a HAZOP is the division of a process or activity into discrete 
segments called nodes. Node selection is designed to facilitate the hazard identification process 
by focusing the attention of the team on specific process sections or operating steps. The team 
applies the HAZOP process to each node in a stepwise fashion. The waste retrieval system 
HAZOP for the modified sluicing system was based on the following nodes to capture points in 
the process where deviations could result in significant consequences: 
NodeA: 
NodeB: 
NodeC: 
0 NodeD: 
NodeE: 
NodeF: 
NodeG: 
NodeH: 
NodeI: 
NodeJ: 
NodeK: 
Equipment installation and decommissioning 
Water supply system, including flush systems for transfer lines 
Sluicing system 
Transfer pump 
Transfer lines, SST to DST and SST recirculation 
SST ventilation system 
DST receiver tank ventilation system 
SST being retrieved 
DST receiver tank 
Instrumentation and camera system 
Criticality Concerns (what if?). 
The hazardous conditions presented under Node K are intended to indicate that the hazard 
evaluation team performed a broad brush "what if' evaluation to ensure that criticality concerns 
are appropriately addressed. 
The HAZOP results were used as input for this safety evaluation to identify and evaluate 
hazardous conditions that may not be adequately addressed by the tank farms safety basis. 
The HAZOP data was used in this safety evaluation to compare the identified hazardous 
conditions to the DSA representative and/or candidate accidents. The safety evaluation includes 
consideration of the safety basis controls (ie., safety SSCs and technical safety requirements 
[TSR]), which the HAZOP did not consider. Any HAZOP identified hazardous conditions that 
were estimated not to be adequately addressed by the DSA accident analysis and controls are 
discussed in this safety evaluation. 
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3.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
No key assumptions were identified for this safety evaluation. 
3.4 HAZOP RESULTS 
The HAZOP team identified 1 1 1 hazardous conditions associated with operation of the SST 
waste retrieval modified sluicing system. The team used the consolidated hazardous conditions 
from the HAZOPs for SSTs 241-S-112 (RPP-9014), 241-U-107 (RPP-7689), and 241-C-106 
(WP-13557) and the Justification for Continued Operation for modified sluicing in SSTs 
241 4-1 12 and 241-U-107 as a starting point, identifying new hazardous conditions as necessary. 
3.5 HAZARDOUS CONDITION SCREENING 
Hazardous conditions were screened to determine if they 1) are not represented by a DSA 
representative accident, 2) are similar to, but not bounded by a DSA representative accident, 
3) are similar to and bounded by a DSA representative accident but are unique in regard to 
process or control applicability, or 4) are not appropriately represented by a candidate accident. 
Hazardous conditions meeting one or more of these criteria require further evaluation. 
Chapters 4.0 and 5 .O of this safety evaluation document the evaluation of these hazardous 
conditions. Hazardous conditions not meeting the screening criteria were not further evaluated 
and will not be incorporated into the DSA hazard evaluation database. 
Hazardous conditions involving exposure to radioactive and other hazardous materials were 
assigned a representative accident and/or a candidate accident designator as appropriate. The 
representative accident designator allows cross reference to the appropriate analysis in the DSA. 
Candidate accident designators allow hazardous conditions to be compared with the hazardous 
conditions contained in the DSA hazard evaIuation database. Thirty-one hazaxdous conditions 
were identified as meeting the screening criteria and are presented in Appendix C. The 
information in Appendix C reflects the final results of this safety evaluation. 
The break down of these hazardous conditions is as follows: 
IO 
6 
3 
3 
8 
Representative Accident 1, Flammable Gas Accidents (Candidate 
Accidents 04/05) 
Representative Accident 2, Nuclear Criticality (Candidate Accident 01) 
Representative Accident 4, Release from Contaminated Facility (Candidate 
Accident 07) 
Representative Accident 13, Waste Transfer Leak (Candidate Accident 33) 
Identifiable to a Candidate Accident but DSA Hazardous Conditions Determined 
to be RiskBin III or IV (Le., no Representative Accident identified), Filtration 
Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases (Candidate Accidents 0611 83) 
Identifiable to a Candidate Accident but DSA Hazardous Conditions Determined 
to be Risk Bin III or IV (i.e.. no Representative Accident identified), Tank Bump 
(Candidate Accident 18A) 
1 
3 -4 
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3.6 DETAILED DISCUSSION 
The following text provides a brief discussion of the specific reasons that hazardous conditions 
were identified for further evaluation: 
Ten hazardous conditions involving flammable gas accidents (Representative Accident 1, 
Candidate Accident 05, deflagrations in other than DSTs) were identified as having the 
characteristics sufficiently different from the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard evaluation 
database to warrant further evaluation. The specific concern involves deflagrations resulting 
Erom induced gas reIease events (GRE). The process of retrieving waste by sluicing fkom an 
SST has the potential for creating induced releases of flammable gas that were not evaluated in 
the DSA. 
Hazardous conditions involving nuclear criticality (Representative Accident 2, Candidate 
Accident 01) were identified that are very similar to the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard 
evaluation database. They are included with the hazardous conditions requiring fiuther 
evaluation to ensure that criticality concerns are verified as adequately addressed. 
Three hazardous conditions involving release from contaminated facility (Representative 
Accident 4, Candidate Accident 07) were identified as having characteristics sufficiently 
different from the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard evaluation database to warrant further 
evaluation. The concern is associated with the possible use of a hydraulic motor driven positive 
displacement transfer pump, hydraulically powered nozzle indexer (rotation), and hydraulically 
powered articulation actuator (radial position). Use of hydraulic power creates the potential for 
combustible fluid to be released and ignited in a contaminated area pit which is not addressed in 
the current DSA. 
Three hazardous conditions involving waste leaks (Representative Accident 13, Candidate 
Accidents 33A, 33C, and 33E) were identified as having characteristics sufficiently different 
fiom the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard evaluation database to warrant further 
evaluation. The specific concerns involve the potential for transfer system pressures higher than 
what was evaluated in the current DSA analysis. This is due to the use of a progressive cavity 
positive displacement pump to transfer mobilized waste from an SST. Positive displacement 
pumps have the potential for producing very high pressures under the off-normal conditions. 
Eight hazardous conditions associated with filtration failures leading to unfiltered releases 
(Candidate Accidents 06 and 18B) were identified as having higher consequences than reported 
in the DSA. The specific concern involves the potential for the release source term to be greater 
than what was used in the current DSA analysis. 
One hazardous condition associated with tank bump (Candidate Accident 1XA) was identified as 
having characteristics sufficiently different from the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard 
evaluation database to warrant further evaluation. The specific concern involves water 
infiltration and subsequent steam evolution behind the steel SST liner. Such an event has 
happened in the tank farms in the past. The current DSA control suit does not address this 
accident. However, based on the following qualitative argument, no discussion is necessary in 
Chapters 4.0 or 5.0 of this safety evaluation. 
3-5 
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Tank bump resulting from water intrusion behind an SST liner is judged to have a frequency 
“beyond extremely unlikely. Hazardous conditions with a frequency of “beyond extremely 
unlikely” require no further evaluation. The frequency estimate is based on the fact that a heat 
load of > 1 1.3 kW is required to result in waste temperatures that exceed the saturation 
temperature of water (RPP-6213). Only four SSTs (241-A-104,241-AX-104,241-C-103, and 
241-C-107) have heat loads in excess of 11.3 kW (RPP-5926, Steady-State Flammable Gas 
Release Rate and Lower Flammability Level Evaluation for Hanford Tank Waste). Current 
waste temperature data shows that these tanks are well below the saturation temperature of 
water. The highest temperature found in these four tanks is 76 “C (168.8 OF) (SST 241-A-104). 
These tanks have been under passive cooling conditions for many years and show no trend of 
increasing temperature. Since the temperature is substantially below the saturation of water there 
is no possibility of steam bubble formation behind the tank liner no matter what quantity of water 
is involved. 
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4.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
4.1 EVALUATION OF RISK FROM MODIFIED SLUICING OF 
WASTE FOR DSA REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS 
4.1.1 Flammable Gas Accidents 
4.1.1.1 DSA Representative Accident 
The DSA related representative accident is (Candidate Accident 04/05), Flammable Gas 
Accidents and is addressed in DSA Section 3.3.2.4.1, “Flammable Gas Accidents,” addresses 
this hazardous condition. The DSA evaluates flammable gas hazards in all tank farm facilities 
where waste is present, including DSTs, SSTs, double-contained receiver tanks (DCRT), active 
catch tanks, inactive tanks, waste transfer-associated structures, waste transfer systems, and 
waste-intruding equipment. There are two mechanisms by which waste-generated flammable 
gases can reach high concentrations in tank farm facilities. First, flammable gases generated by 
the waste are continuously released into vapor spaces. In the absence of adequate ventilation, the 
steady-state concentration of these gases can potentially exceed the lower flammability limit 
(LFL). Second, a fraction of the gas generated by the waste can be retained within the waste. 
This retained gas can be released in a spontaneous or induced GRE thereby increasing the 
flammable gas concentration in a tank headspace to above the LFL. 
The representative accident for DSTs (Candidate Accident 04) is a headspace deflagration due to 
a steady-state accumulation of flammable gas or a spontaneous GRE. Without controls, the DSA 
qualitatively determined the frequency of a headspace deflagration in a DST due to a steady-state 
accumulation of flammable gases or a spontaneous GRE to be “unlikely.” The deflagration in 
the headspace of a DST is qualitatively determined to result in “low” onsite radiological 
consequences, “low” offsite toxicological consequences, and “moderate” onsite toxicological 
consequences. Safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and/or TSRs are 
required based on the Risk Bin 11 result associated with the onsite toxicological consequences. 
Other hazardous conditions associated with the DST flammable gas representative accident 
address various DST deflagration scenarios (e.g., different flammable gas sources, different 
ignition sources). The other accident scenarios identified in the DSA as requiring 
safety-significant SSCs andor TSRs based on either their risk binning results OT their potential 
for significant facility worker consequences are DST Headspace Deflagration Due to an Induced 
GRE, Deflagration in a DST Annulus, Deflagration in DST Waste-Intruding Equipment, 
Deflagration in a Waste Transfer Line, and DST Gasoline Deflagration. The DST accident 
scenarios relevant to modified sIuicing operations are summarized below: 
DST Headspace Deflagration Due to an Induced GRE. This hazardous condition is 
identical to the representative accident except that the flammable gas concentration in the 
headspace reaches the LFL due to an induced GRE. As documented in PNNL-13781, 
Eflects of Globally Waste-Disturbing Activities on Gas Generation, Retention, and 
Release in Hanford Waste Tanks, activities with the potential to induce a significant GRE 
4- 1 
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in DSTs are waste transfers, mixer pump operation, air lift circulator operation, and large 
water or chemical additions. Because these are current or planned activities, the 
frequency without controls was qualitatively determined to be “anticipated.” 
Safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs are required based on the Risk Bin I result 
associated with the onsite toxicological consequences. 
Deflagration in DST Waste-Intruding Equipment. Waste-intruding equipment is 
equipment that is inserted below the waste surface and is open ended, breached, or uses a 
mechanical seal as a barrier to electrical components and creates an unvented vapor space 
where flammable gases generated or retained in the waste may accumulate (e.g., core 
sample drill pipes, pump suction legs, weight factor dip tubes). Incidents have occurred 
where the concentration of flammable gas in waste-intruding equipment has exceeded the 
LFL. These incidents were attributed to the equipment encountering gas pockets in the 
waste. Flammable gas concentrations exceeding the LFL in waste-intruding equipment 
have also resulted from steady-state generation and accumulation. Given this operational 
history, the frequency of a deflagration in waste-intruding equipment without controls 
was qualitatively determined to be “anticipated.” The consequences were qualitatively 
determined to be “low” for the onsite and offsite receptors due to the localized nature of 
the deflagration and the smaller material at risk (MAR) relative to the representative 
accident. This frequency/consequence combination yields a Risk Bin rII result for the 
onsite and offsite receptors. It was, however, qualitatively determined that a deflagration 
in waste-intruding equipment could result in significant facility worker consequences 
(Le., a prompt fatality or serious injuries or significant radiological or chemical 
exposures). Accordingly, safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs are required. This 
evaluation is also applicable to waste-intruding equipment in SSTs. 
Deflagration in a Waste Transfer Line. There is limited potential for flammable gas 
accumulation and ignition in either the primary or encasement piping of a waste transfer 
line. The frequency of a deflagration without controls was qualitatively determined to be 
“unlikely.” The consequences were qualitatively determined to be “low” for the onsite 
and offsite receptors due to the limited volume of hydrogen and the smaller MAR relative 
to the representative accident. This frequencylconsequence combination yields a Risk 
Bin ILI result for the onsite and offsite receptors. It was, however, qualitatively 
determined that a deflagration in a waste transfer line could result in significant facility 
worker consequences (Le., a prompt fatality or serious injuries or significant radiological 
or chemical exposures). Accordingly, safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs are required. 
The representative accident for SSTs (Candidate Accident 05) is a headspace deflagration due to 
a steady-state accumulation of flammable gas. Without controls, the DSA qualitatively 
determined the frequency o f a  headspace deflagration in an SST due to a steady-state 
accumulation of flammable gas to be “unlikely.” The deflagration in the headspace of an SST is 
qualitatively determined to result in “moderate” onsite radiological consequences, “low” offsite 
toxicological consequences, and “moderate” onsite toxicological consequences. Safety- 
significant SSCs and/or TSRs are required based on the Risk Bin I1 result associated with the 
onsite radiological and toxicological consequences. 
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Ofher hazardous conditions associated with the SST flammable gas representative accident 
address various SST deflagration scenarios (e.g., different flammable gas sources, different 
ignition sources). The other accident scenarios identified in the DSA as requiring 
safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs based on either their risk binning results or their potential 
for significant facility worker consequences are SST Headspace Deflagation Due to stn Induced 
GRE, Deflagration in SST Waste-Intruding Equipment, SST Gasoline Deflagration, Deflagration 
in a Double-Contained Receiver Tank, Deflagration in an Active Catch Tank, Deflagration in a 
Waste Transfer-Associated Structure, Deflagration in a Waste Transport Cask, and Deflagration 
in Inactive Tanks. The accident scenarios relevant to modified sluicing operations are 
summarized below: 
SST Headspace Deflagration Due to an Induced GRE. This hazardous condition is 
identical to the representative accident except that the flammable gas concentration in the 
headspace reaches the LFL due to an induced GRE. As documented in PNNL-13781, 
activities with the potential to induce a significant GRE in SSTs are saltwell pumping and 
water additiondsaltcake dissolution. Because these are planned activities, the frequency 
without controls was qualitatively determined to be “anticipated.” Safety-significant 
SSCs and/or TSRs are required based on the Risk Bin I result associated with the onsite 
radiological and toxicological consequences. 
Deflagration in SST Waste-Intruding Equipment. Refer to the DST summary above. 
Deflagration in a Waste Transfer-Associated Structure. There are two means by 
which flammable gas can be present in a waste transfer-associated structure. First, 
flammable gases can enter a structure if it is connected via open piping, drain lines, or 
risers to an SST, DST, or other waste storage facility. Second, flammable gases would be 
produced if waste were present in a structure due to a waste transfer misroute OT transfer 
line failure. In the absence of controls, the flammable gas concentration could exceed the 
LFL via either means. 
The frequency and consequences of fl ammable gas deflagrations in typical waste 
transfer-associated structures (e.g., pump pits, valve pits) are qualitatively addressed in 
DSA Section 3.3.2.4.4. The frequency of a postulated flammable gas deflagration in a 
waste transfer-associated structure without controls depends on the source of the 
flammable gas hazard (e.g., flammable gases entering from a connected tank, flammable 
gases generated by waste from a new or past leak) with the highest frequency being 
“anticipated.” The radiological consequences to the onsite worker and toxicological 
consequences to the offsite public are qualitatively determined to be “low,” and the 
toxicological consequences to the onsite worker are qualitatively determined to be 
“moderate.” Safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs are required based on the Risk Bin I1 
result associated with the onsite toxicological consequences. 
4.1.1.2 Modified Sluicing Operations Hazardous Conditions 
The HAZOP for modified sluicing systems and operations described in Chapter 3.0 identified 
potential hazardous conditions that could result in a flammable gas deflagration. However, the 
only hazardous conditions identified that require additional safety evaluation are associated with 
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the induced release of flammable gases caused by modified sluicing operations in SSTs. The 
other identified flammable gas hazardous conditions are addressed by the existing DSA hazard 
and accident analyses and derived controls (Le., safety SSCs andor TSRs), and no further 
evaluation is required. This section, therefore, only evaluates induced GRE flammable gas 
hazardous conditions in SSTs caused by modified sluicing operations. 
During modified sluicing operations in SSTs flammable gases retained in the waste will be 
released. Trapped gases exist as small bubbles in the interstices of the solid waste matrix, 
separated from other bubbles and the headspace by interstitial liquid. During modified sluicing 
operations, drainage of the interstitial liquid from the undisturbed solid waste matrix, dissolution 
of the saltcake matrix, and mechanical break-up of the solid waste matrix will release trapped 
gases. Draining reduces the tank interstitial liquid level, releasing any entrained gas bubbles. 
Waste dissolution involves liquid addition causing saltcake to dissolve, thus releasing any 
trapped gas. Mechanical disturbance of the waste such as by sluicing, vortex action, or pump 
suction and return, causes shea  forces on the solid waste matrix releasing entrained gas bubbles. 
All three of these gas release mechanisms (draining, dissolution, and mechanical disturbance) 
individually and collectively contribute to the flammable gas concentration within the SST 
headspace during modified sluicing operations. 
PNNL-14271, Flammable Gas Release Estimates for Modified Sluicing Retrieval of Waste from 
Selected Hanford Single-Shell Tanks, evaluates the potential for induced GRE flammable gas 
hazards in SSTs during modified sluicing operations. Models developed to estimate retained gas 
releases, conservative retained gas inventory estimates, tank data, and anticipated waste retrieval 
rates were used to evaluate the dissolution and erosion of saltcake by water jets impinging on the 
waste surface, and the drainage of interstitial liquids from saltcake and the dissolution of saltcake 
by unsaturated liquids during a shutdown of modified sluicing operations. 
The results of the evaluation in PNNL-14271 show that under conservative assumptions the 
flammable gas concentration in the SST headspace can rapidly approach 25% of the LFL when 
the tank is passively ventilated (e.g., for SST 241-S-112,25% of the LFL i s  reached in just over 
8 hr). Use of a portable exhauster within the assumed operating range of 270 to 475 ft3/min 
prevents the SST headspace from reaching 25% of the LFL. Conservative estimates of gas 
release volumes after modified sluicing shutdown show that SST headspace flammable gas 
concentrations could exceed 100% of the LFL assuming no ventilation, complete interstitial 
drainage, and release of a11 retained gas from the region above the final interstitial liquid level. 
The free liquid inventories in an SST (Le., maximum allowable tank inventory of process water 
and minimum level of liquid in the central pool) that would prevent exceeding 100% of the LFL 
in the SST headspace afier modified sluicing shutdown are calculated. 
4.1.1.3 Accident Consequence Comparison 
The consequences of a flammable gas deflagration caused by an induced GRE during modified 
sluicing operations are bounded by the DSA analysis of SST deflagrations (Le., “moderate” 
onsite radiological consequences, “low” offsite toxicological consequences, and “moderate” 
onsite toxicological consequences). That is, material source terms, release fractions, and 
airborne respirable fractions are bounded by the DSA analysis for deflagration in an SST. 
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4.1.1.4 Accident Frequency Comparison 
Flammable gas deflagrations due to induced GRE flammable gas hazardous conditions caused by 
modified sluicing operation in SSTs was qualitatively determined to be “anticipated” which is 
the same as the frequency of the induced GRE accident scenario in the DSA. 
4.1.1.5 Accident Risk Bin Results Without Controls 
Based on the risk binning methodology presented in the DSA, an induced GRE flammable gas 
deflagration accident caused by modified sluicing operations in an SST with an “anticipated” 
frequency results in a Risk Bin I for onsite radiological and toxicological (moderate 
consequence) and Risk Bin HI for offsite toxicological (low consequence). 
4.1.1.6 Safety-Significant SSCs and TSR Controls 
Based on the hazard evaluation of postulated induced GRE flammable gas hazards in SSTs 
caused by modified sluicing operations, safety-significant SSCs and/or TSRs are required to 
protect the onsite (and facility) worker. For induced GRE flammable gas hazards in the DSA, 
there are no identified safety-significant SSCs, but the following TSR is established to prevent 
induced GRE flammable gas hazards. 
A flammable gas concentration control point of 5 25% of the LFL shall be implemented for all 
tank f m  facilities during activities that can induce a gas release that can achieve 100% of the 
LFL without the use of flammable gas concentration controls (cg., active or manually 
configured passive ventilation, process controls, flammable gas concentration monitoring and 
proceduralized actions). Any combination of flammable gas concentration controls may be used 
to maintain the flammable gas concentration 5 25% of the LFL. Flammable gas concentration 
controls shall be monitored on a sufficient frequency to ensure that appropriate actions are taken 
for conditions > 25% of the LFL. 
Flammable gas concentration controls shall be documented in a process control plan such that 
the ffammable gas concentration is maintained 5 25% of the LFL. A process control plan will 
not be required for saltwell pumping. 
If the concentration of flammable gas is > 25% of the LFL: 
1. Immediately stop all activities in and directly above the affected tank, except for the 
following: 
a. Flammable gas sampling/monitoring. 
b. Deenergizing, removing, or stopping the use of equipment that does not meet ignition 
controls. 
c. Actions to reduce the flammable gas concentration. 
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2.  Prior to the concentration of flammable gas exceeding 60% of the LFL: 
a. Stop all activities in enclosed spaces connected to the affected tank headspace, except 
for flammable gas samplinglmonitonng and actions to reduce the flammable gas 
concentration. 
b. Deenergize, remove, or stop use of equipment that does not meet ignition controls in 
the affected tank headspace and connected enclosed spaces. 
The flammable gas concentration controls selected as an acceptable method to implement this 
TSR for modified sluicing operations are : 
1. Develop process controls such that the anticipated flammable gas concentration in Waste 
Group B SSTs is maintained 5 25% of the LFL for modified sluicing operations. (Note: 
Active ventilation may be used to maintain the flammable gas concentration 5 25% of 
the LFL.) 
2. Periodically monitor the flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace to verify 
that it is 5 25% of the LFL during modified sluicing operations in Waste Group B SSTs. 
If the flammable gas concentration is > 25% of the LFL, take the actions prescribed in 
the TSR. (Note: Actions taken if the flammable gas concentration is 25% of the LFL 
include stopping modified sluicing operations.) 
Note: There are no Waste Group A SSTs, and there is no induced GRE flammable gas 
hazard in Waste Group C SSTs (is., there is insufficient retained gas to achieve 
100% of the LFL if 100% of the retained gas was instantaneously released) and, 
therefore, induced GRE flammable gas concentration controls are not required. 
The specific process controls to maintain the flammable gas concentration 5 25% of the LFL 
(e.g., active ventilation) and the periodicity for monitoring the flammable gas concentration in 
the tank headspace will be specified in the process control plan. The flammable gas monitoring 
frequency will be based on a conservative evaluation of the time for the flammable gas 
concentration to increase by 25% of the LFL (e.g., PNNL-14271). For example, based on the 
evaluation of SST 2414-112 in PNNL-14271 (see Section 4.1.1.2), the frequencyof flammable 
gas monitoring would be at least once every 8 hr. Periodic flammable gas monitoring would also 
continue after shutdown of modified sluicing operations until a downward trend is observed that 
demonstrates that 25% of the LFL will not be exceeded. 
In addition to the above flammable gas concentration controls, if active Ventilation is required to 
maintain the flammable gas concentration 5 25% of the LFL, process controls will be developed 
such that the flammable gas concentration is maintained 5 100% of the LFL following the loss of 
active ventilation and shutdown of modified sluicing operations. The specific process controls 
(e.g., maximum allowable tank inventory of process water and minimum level of liquid in the 
central pool derived in the PNNL-14271 evaluation) will be specified in the process control plan. 
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4.1.1.7 Conclusions 
Potential flammable gas hazards caused by modified sluicing operations are addressed and 
bounded by the DSA representative accidents. Postulated flammable gas accidents are also 
acceptably controlled by existing safety SSCs and TSRs, and no additional controls are 
necessary. Specific flammable gas concentration controls to implement the existing TSR 
requirement for induced flammable gas hazard controls have been defined. 
4.1.2 Criticality 
4.1.2.1 DSA Representative Accident 
The DSA-related representative accident is 02 (Candidate Accident Ol), Nuclear Criticality. The 
technical basis for the nuclear criticality safety of waste stored in underground tanks at the 
Hanford Site is summarized in DSA Section 3.3.2.4.2, “Nuclear Criticality.” The DSA analysis 
postulated a mistransfer of waste from the Plutonium Finishing Plant that was routed to a DST 
where a criticality occurred. 
The DSA indicates that no credible scenario has been identified for a criticality in a waste tank 
because of normal operations of waste storage. The potential for a criticality as a result of a 
mistransfer was analyzed. The potential for an accidental criticality without controls was 
estimated to be “beyond extremely unlikely.” The criticality accident onsite radiological and 
onsite and offsite toxicological consequences are “low” (i.e., < 25 rem, < TEEG1, and 
< TEEL-2, respectively). Based on the estimated consequences and qualitative judgment, all the 
exposure categories were assigned to Risk Bin IV, which typically do not require safety SSC or 
TSR-level controls. However, one TSR-level control was selected to protect the frequency 
assumption as described in the DSA. 
4.1.2.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Conditions 
The modified sluicing waste retrieval system HAZOP concluded the potential for a criticality in 
the source SST and the receiving DST to remain in Risk Bin IV. 
4.1.2.3 Accident Frequency Comparison 
RPP-7475, Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Side Tank Farm Facility, Section 2.8, 
“Sludge Retrieval Process Description,” describes tank farm waste retrieval operations. 
Criticality concerns associated with sludge retrieval operations were evaluated in RPP-7475, 
Section 6.13, “Sludge Retrieval.” The tank Sludge contains most of the plutonium inventory of 
the tanks, which could create a criticality concern. Sludge retrieval operations involving waste 
retrieval modified sluicing operations were evaluated in RPP-7475. It was concluded that 
criticality due to sludge retrieval operations was not a concern. Sludge retrieval operations were 
considered to be the same as previously analyzed fluid dynamic sludge systems, specifically 
mixer pumps, air lift circulators, or sluicing relative to potential to create a criticality. Based on 
the evaluation in RPP-7475, it is concluded that criticality due to waste retrieval modified 
sluicing system operations remains “beyond extremely unlikely” without application of controls, 
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and therefore, there is no increase in the frequency of a criticality accident as analyzed in the 
DSA. 
4.1.2.4 Accident Consequence Comparison 
The consequence of an unplanned nuclear criticality in a waste tank includes release of fission 
gases, small amounts of aerosolized plutonium, and tank waste (DSA, Section 3.3.2.4.2.3). 
A criticality due to modified sluicing system operations would not result in an increase in SST 
source tern considering the MAR, leak path factors (LPF), airborne release fractions (ARF), or 
respirable fraction (RF). As such, there would be no increase in potential radiological dose 
consequences from the SST being retrieved. A qualitative evaluation of the consequences of a 
nuclear criticality accident is described in WP-12371, Technical Basisfor the Nuclear 
Criticality Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions. Based on a review of 
this document, it is concluded that the DSA analysis unit-liter dose (ULD) values bound the 
ULD values of DST liquids and the ULD of the slurry mixture to be transferred from the 
1 00-series SSTs. As such, the DSA representative accident analysis radiological dose 
consequences remain bounding for a criticality from modified sluicing system operations. 
4.1.2.5 Safety SSCs and TSR Controls 
Administrative Control (AC) 5.7, “Safety Management Programs,” Section 5.7.2, Program Key 
Element “a” requires that the safety management programs (SMP) of DSA Chapters 6.0 through 
17.0 to be established, implemented, and maintained. Chapter 6.0 of the DSA outlines the 
criticality safety program, which protects the assumptions on the current configuration of the 
tank waste with respect to criticality by establishing waste acceptance criteria (e.g., limits on 
fissile material concentration and alkalinity) for wastes entering the tank farms from outside 
sources. The criticality safety program also requires that criticality safety evaluations be 
performed for proposed tank farm operations that could change the form of the fissile material 
(e.g., dissociation of the fissile material from bound neutron absorbers by acid additions) or the 
distribution of the fissile material in the tanks (e.g., concentration of the fissile material). 
4.1.2.6 Conclusions 
A criticality evaluation of modified sluicing waste retrieval system operations concluded that a 
criticality was not credible. TSR controls are in place to ensure that the assumptions used to 
derive this conclusion remain vaIid. As such, the DSA representative accident remains bounding 
and no additional controls are necessary. 
4.1.3 Release from Contaminated Facility 
The DSA, Section 3.3.2.4.4, “Release from Contaminated Facility,” provides the evaluation of 
this representative accident. Numerous contaminated areas exist within the tank farm facilities 
that are susceptible to releasing hazardous material, specifically during a fire. Contamination of 
tank farm facilities occurs from various operations required to manage tank waste. 
Contaminated facilities at the tank farms include waste transfer-associated structures (e.g., valve 
pits, pump pits, diversion boxes, clean-out boxes), 244-CR Vault cells, 242-T Evaporator, etc. 
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The hazard analysis performed for tank farm facilities and operations, including 
“F-SD-WM-FHA-020, Tank Farms Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), identify energy sources 
that could result in the uncontrolled release of radioactive and other hazardous material from 
contaminated tank farm facilities. 
A qualitative evaluation of the frequency, consequences, and risk bin without controls for 
postulated release accidents from contaminated facilities, and the controls (Le., safety SSCs and 
TSRs) selected to prevent or mitigate these previously analyzed accidents, are described in 
RPP- 1 3354, Technical Basis for the Release from Contaminated Facilify Representative 
Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions. These qualitative evaluations and 
the resulting controls for the uncontrolled release of radioactive and other hazardous material 
from contaminated facilities are addressed in Section 3.3.2.4.4 of the DSA. 
4.1.3.1 DSA Representative Accident 
A flammable gas deflagration in a waste transfer-associated structure is considered the bounding 
representative accident for a Release from a Contaminated Facility as discussed in the DSA. In 
this bounding accident scenario, flammable gases from a connected tank (e.g., DST, SST) or 
from waste present in the structure accumulate to the LFL and are ignited. Other identified 
energy sources that could result in uncontrolled releases from waste transfer-associated 
structures or other Contaminated facilities include load-handling (e.g., load drop) accidents, 
compressed gas system failures, and other fires. Postulated causes of these other fires include 
electrical fires; fires due to maintenance activities (e.g., cutting, grinding, welding) and transient 
combustibles; and vehicle fuel fires. The FHA provides a complete description of the hazards 
investigated. 
4.1.3.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Conditions 
The waste retrieva1 modified sluicing system design introduces sluice nozzles and actuators that 
are hydraulically driven. These hydraulic lines, if ruptured, could leak into a pit and could be 
subject to internal fires (e.g., electrical or fluid) or exposed to vehicle fuel fires or other external 
fires (e.g., range fires or lighting initiated tires). 
A HAZOP was performed to identify and evaluate potential hazards associated with SST waste 
retrieval modified sluicing system. The results of the HAZOP were reviewed to determine 
potential hazardous conditions created by the waste retrieval modified sluicing system and to 
identify potential hazardous conditions that may not be adequately bounded by current tank 
farms (DSA) analyzed representative accidents. 
Hazardous conditions involving energy sources that could result in the uncontrolled release of 
radioactive and other hazardous material from contaminated tank farm facilities similar to those 
associated with the waste retrieval modified sluicing system have previously been considered in 
the DSA as Representative Accident Number 4 (Candidate Accident 7). A total of 11 hazardous 
conditions involving releases from contaminated facilities associated with the waste retrieval 
modified sluicing system operations were identified via the HAZOP process. The hazardous 
conditions expected during conduct of the waste retrieval modified sluicing system operations 
are similar to those previously identified in the tank farm operations hazards analysis database, 
Section 3.3.1.7, “Hazard Analysis Database,” with the exception of the additional hydraulic line 
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rupture leaking hydraulic fluid into a pit. Three of these hazardous conditions were identified as 
having characteristics sufficiently different from the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard 
evaluation database to warrant further evaluation (i.e., MODSLUIC-C-031, 
MODSLUIC-D-O03a, and MODSLUIC-D-003b). 
4.1.3.3 Accident Frequency Comparison 
The frequency of a postulated fire within a contaminated structure without controls is dependent 
on the cause of the fire. An electrical fire, or fire due to maintenance activities or transient 
combustibles in a contaminated facility without controls, is also qualitatively estimated as 
“anticipated” based on operating experience. Since, the DSA estimated frequency for these 
accident scenarios is already “anticipated” without controls, the uncontrolled accident frequency 
cannot be increased by modified sluicing waste retrieval system operations. A frequency of 
‘’unlikely” however was determined qualitatively for this postulated hazardous condition and 
therefore bounded by the DSA estimated frequency of “anticipated.” “Unlikely” was chosen 
because the hydraulic fluid is limited to approximately 150 gal and has a high flashpoint 
(e.g., > 380 “F, and a NFPA Fire Rating of I). 
4.1.3.4 Accident Consequence Comparison 
To estimate the potential consequences of a fire in a contaminated facility, the MAR is 
conservatively assumed in the DSA to be the equivalent of between 10 and 100 L of tank waste 
with solids fractions ranging from 1% to 10%. 
The ARF and RF used to determine the amount of respirable material released during a fire in a 
contaminated facility are from DOE-HDBK-3010-94, Airborne Release Fructions/Rates and 
Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. An ARF of 0.2 and an RF of 0.3 for an 
aqueous solution or air-dried salts under a gasoline fire on a surface that is a strong conductor of 
heat (Le., metal) are considered to conservatively bound releases from a fire. 
Based on the above MAR and release fractions, the total amount of respirable material 
suspended by a fire in a contaminated facility represented by a waste transfer-associated 
structure is conservatively estimated to be between a few mL and 2.5 L, depending on the release 
mechanism. Radiological and toxicological consequences for this material release are estimated 
using the bounding radiological ULD for all tank wastes, the bounding toxicological sum of 
fraction (SOF) values for all tank wastes, and the accident analysis methodology described in 
RPP-I 3354. For the fire, a conservative release duration of 15 min was assumed for estimating 
consequences. In addition, the fire analysis included the thermal (buoyant) effects of the fire 
when determining the atmospheric dispersion coefficients. 
The radiological consequences to the onsite worker and toxicological consequences to the offsite 
public are “low” (< 25 rem, < TEEL-1, and < TEEL-2, respectively) based on the conservative 
calculations in RPP-13354 for fires in contaminated facilities (see DSA Table 3.3.2.4.4-1). 
The waste retrieval modified sluicing system design uses existing tank f m  pits with drains. 
Hence, little to no accumulation of wastes is expected within the pits as a result of a spill or leak. 
The 42-L of MAR previously analyzed in the DSA is considered bounding for this scenario. 
Additionally, a review of the waste retrieval modified sluicing system indicates that only a 
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limited amount of combustibles may be available to bum from a hydraulic oil rupture 
(approximately 150 gal) and the hydraulic oil has a high ffashpoint (e.g., > 380 O F ,  and NFPA 
Fire Rating of 1). Therefore, the DSA consequences for a “Release from Contaminated Facility” 
would remain bounding. 
4.1.3.5 Safety SSCs and TSR Controls 
Based on the low offsite and onsite consequences, there are no TSR andor safety SSC controls 
required for this postulated accident. 
4.1.3.6 Conclusions 
Based upon this safety evaluation, the DSA representative accident for “Release from 
Contaminated Facility” adequately bounds the frequency and consequences of similar hazards 
(e.g., fires) involving the waste retrieval modified sluicing system operations, when considering 
the application of current TSR controls. 
No additional controls are necessary to prevent andor mitigate releases from contaminated 
facilities due to waste retrieval modified sluicing operations. 
4.1.4 Waste Transfer Leaks 
4.1.4.1 DSA Representative Accidents 
The DSA representative accidents are the “fine spray into the air” scenario and the “large pipe 
break into a pit” scenario. The fine spray into the air scenario assumes that a small width crack 
(the optimal width for producing fine aerosol) has occurred in a waste transfer line, and that 
waste slurry is spraying into the air under maximum available pump pressure. The large pipe 
break into a pit scenario assumes that a large pipe break has occurred, and that waste is leaking 
into an open pit at the maximum flow rate of the transfer pump. DSA Section 3.3.2.4.13, “Waste 
Transfer Leak,” addresses these hazardous conditions. The DSA section also addresses several 
other accident scenarios, but the fine spray into the air and the large pipe break into a pit scenario 
are the limiting scenarios. The DSA estimates the frequency of the fine spray into the air 
scenario to be “unlikely,” and the large pipe break into a pit scenario to be “anticipated.” The 
onsite radiological and toxicological guidelines are exceeded for the two representative accident 
scenarios, and safety SSCs andor TSR controls are required. The offsite radiological and 
toxicological guidelines are not exceeded. 
4.1.4.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Conditions 
The waste retrieval modified sluicing system HAZOP identified numerous hazardous conditions 
that could occur during modified sluicing system operations that would result in waste transfer 
leaks. These conditions involve leaks occumng in transfer lines at various locations and in 
various configurations. All of these scenarios are similar to scenarios already evaluated in DSA 
Section 3.3.2.4.13. The significant analysis parameters that differ in value between modified 
sluicing and the existing DSA include ULDs, SOFs, I3’Cs and 90Sr concentrations, maximum 
transfer pump pressure, and maximum transfer pump flow rate. Other parameters significant to 
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the calculation of radiological dose and toxicological exposure values are expected to be the 
same for modified sluicing and the DSA (e.g., x/Q atmospheric dispersion values). If the values 
of all of these parameters for the modified sluicing system are bounded by the values of these 
parameters used for the current DSA analysis, then it may be concluded that modified sluicing is 
bounded by the current DSA. 
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 provide a comparison of the analysis parameter values for properties 
associated with the waste (ULDs, SOFs, I3'Cs and "Sr concentrations), and for properties 
associated with the transfer pumps (maximum transfer pump pressure, and maximum transfer 
pump flow rate) for modified sluicing and the existing DSA analyses. Table 4-3 provides a 
comparison of radiological and toxicological consequence values specifically for the Seepex' 
positive displacement pump. 
ProDerties Associated with the Waste 
The DSA used values for ULD, SOF, 13'Cs concentration and %r concentration that are 
bounding for all tanks in tank farms. Therefore, it is necessarily true that these values bound 
those associated with modified sluicing, which are based on the limiting values for 100-series 
SSTs. However, the DSA assumes that the maximum insoluble solids concentration of a 
pumped waste stream will be 25 ~01%. It has been identified that during modified sluicing, an 
insoluble solids concentration as high as 30 vol% may be achieved for short periods of time. 
Consequently, Table 4-1 presents a comparison of analysis parameter values for properties 
associated with the waste, including waste slurry properties for 30 vol% insoluble solids. 
Offsite ULD Solids 
Offsite Slurry ULD 
Onsite SOF Liquid 
Onsite SOF Solids 
2.9E+5 SvlL 1.9E+5 SvIL 
(Ax-104) 
5.7E+4 S V L  (30 ~01%) ?.4E+4 S V L  (25 ~01%) 
5.8E+8 (TEEL2) 5.73E+8 
3.9Ei-9 (TEEL-2) 6.28E+8 (TEEL2) 
(A-1 06) 
(A-102) 
' Seepex is a registered trademark of Secberger GmbH and Company, Germany. 
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Bounding 100-series SSTs (Modified 
[the bounding tank from which the 
parameter value is taken is shown below 
Cs Liquid 137 
I the parameter] 
I 5.9Ei8 (30 ~01%) Onsite Slurry SOF I 1.4E+9 (25 ~01%) 
7.OE+10 Bq/L 
(AX- 104) 
2.OE+10 BqiL 
5,9E+10 BqiL 5.3E+5 uC~/L'~' 
(A-102) 
I Offsite SOF Liquid I 7.9E+9 (TEEL-1) I 3.71E+9 I 
90Sr Liquid 
1 (A-106) 
Offsite SOF Solids I 3.8E+9 ("EEL-I) I 2.21E+9 (TEELI) 
2.9E+12 BqiL 
(AX-104) 
3.5E+9 Bq/L 5.9E+4 UCUL''' 
I I 1 (TY-102) I 
Slurry Sr-90 
Offsite Slurry SOF I 6.9E+9 (25 ~01%) 
"'Cs Solids 1 7.OE+lOBq/L 1 1.9E+6 uCilL'" 
I 3.3Et9 (30 ~01%) 
2.2E+9 BqIL 
8.7E+ll  Bq/L (30 ~01%) 
(U- 1 06) 
7.3E+11 BqiL (25 ~01%) 
Slurry Cs-137 I 6.2E+10 B q L  (25 ~01%) I 3.5E+10 Bq/L (30 ~01%) 
Sr Solids 1 2.9E+12 BqlL 1 7.98+7 uC~/L(~)  90 
Notes: 
DSA = documented safety analysis. 
SOF = sum offractions. 
SST = single-shell tank. 
TEEL =Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
ULD = unit-liter dose. 
"'Onsite radiological data and onsite and offsite toxicological data from RPP-13750, Wmfe Transfkr Leah Technical 
Basis Document. Offsite radiological data from RPP-14499, Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysisfor the Waste 
Transfer Leak. 
")Radiological data from RPP-5924, Radiologicai Source Termsfor Tank Farms Sajfy Analysis.Rev.3, unless othenvise 
noted. Toxicological data from RPP-8369, Chemical Source Termsfor Tank Farms Safety Anulyses, Rev. 1. 
(3)137Cs and %r data are from the July IO, 2003 download of the Best-Basis Inventory. This is the same download that 
was used as the basis for RPP-5924 Rev.3. The Best-Basis Inventory is maintained t h t ~ l l t w i n s . ~ l , 4 o ~ ~ / ~ s , h t m . ,  
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 
Table 4-1 indicates that waste transfer leak analysis properties associated with the waste to be 
transferred during modified sluicing are bounded by the values of these properties assumed in the 
DSA analysis, except for the "Sr concentration, The 90Sr concentration in the slurry exceeds the 
maximum DSA value for slurries if the insoluble solids concentration is greater than 
approximately 25 vol% insoluble solids. However, the 13'Cs concentration and the 90Sr 
concentration are always used together and are only used to calculate the direct radiation dose 
from a surface pool for the onsite receptor (direct shine does not affect an offsite receptor). 
Consequently, the lower concentration of 137Cs for sluicing tends to compensate for the higher 
concentration of 90Sr. This can be seen by comparing the direct shine dose for the fine spray and 
the large break representative accidents as calculated for the DSA (assuming 25 vol% solids), 
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with the same values calculated using the I3'Cs and 90Sr concentrations from Table 4-1 
(assuming 30 vol% solids). The result is that, for the large pipe break scenario, the DSA value 
for direct shine dose is 3.6E+2 rem (RPP-13750, Table A6-5) and the direct shine dose using 
modified sluicing values for '37Cs and "Sr concentrations is also 3.6B+2 rein (from Excel model 
Large Break 8hr 30% rnodi$ed sluicing (9-26-03).xIs). Similarly, for the fine spray 
representative accident, both the DSA case for 25 vol% solids and the modified sluicing case for 
30 vol% solids give a direct shine dose of 2.2E+1 rem (see RPP-1370 Table A6-1 and Excel 
model Fine Spray 8hr 30% modified sluicing (9-26-03).xls). From these results it is concluded 
that, while the ? S r  concentration for modified sluicing assuming 30 vol% solids is not bounded 
by the 90Sr concentration used for the DSA analysis which assumes a maximum of 25 vol% 
solids, the combination of '37Cs and 90Sr concentrations for modified sluicing is within the 
envelop of the values assumed for purposes of the DSA analyses. Ail of the other waste 
properties used for modified sluicing are individually bounded by the values of those properties 
assumed in the DSA analysis. 
The other modified sluicing properties that are important for the waste transfer leak analysis are 
those associated with the waste transfer pumps. 
Properties Associated with the Transfer Pumps 
Two types of waste transfer pumps are currently planned for use for modified sluicing. The 
Lawrence pump configuration consists of an immersible (also referred to as "submersible") 
pump that provides positive suction head to a vertical inline "booster" pump. These two pumps 
are centrifugal pumps. This configuration was selected to bound the pump configuration that 
will be used for modified sluicing because the final pump configuration has not yet been 
selected. 
The other transfer pump configuration planned for use during modified sluicing consists of a 
single Seepex positive displacement pump. A positive displacement pump is especially 
appropriate for pumping higher solids content waste material. 
Table 4-2 compares the transfer pump properties with those assumed in the DSA. 
A composite pump curve is not available for the Lawrence Centrifugal Pump configuration. 
Therefore, the maximum pressures from the two individual pump curves (i.e., the submersible 
pump and the vertical inline pump) were added to produce an approximate bounding maximum 
pressure for the two pumps operating in series. The maximum flow rate for the two pumps 
operating in series was taken to be the maximum flow rate for the vertical inline pump, since it 
has the lower maximum flow rate of the two pumps and would therefore be limiting. As 
Table 4-2 shows, the Lawrence Centrifugal Pump configuration pump parameters are bounded 
by the pump parameters assumed in the DSA analysis. 
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703. 6ft(ZH3) 
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480 Ib/in2 gauge”’ 
Table 4-2. Properties Associated with the Transfer Pumps. 
Max. Pressure 
I DSA 
790 gaUmin 
800.R 
(approx. 460 ib/inz 
gauge for 7 vol% 
insoluble solids waste) 
Notes: 
DSA = documented safety analysis. 
( I )  This flow rate is for the Vertical Inline Pump. It is taken from Section 8.3, Test No. T3549, CVI #22668 
(*) 153.5 tt is for the submersible pump. It is taken from Section 8.1, Test No. T3553, CVI#22668 Supplement 
(3) 550.1 ft is for the Vertical Inline Pump. It is taken from Section 8.3, Test No. T3549, CVI #22668 Supplement 
(4) This maximum flow rate was based on an extrapolation of pump performance curves in Seepex Operating and 
Supplement No. 141, Qualify Documenlotion Plan, Lawrence Pumps, Inc., Lawrence Mass. 
No. 147, gUo/ity Donrntenration Plan, Lawrence Pumps, Inc., Lawrence Massachusetts. 
No. 141, pUa2iry Donrmentalion Plan, Lawrence Pumps, ‘Inc., Lawrence Massachusetts. 
Mainfenance Instruction for Progressive Cavity Pump BE 53-24, Serial Numbers 806306 and 806307, Section 9 
-Auxiliary Documenfafion. 
(’) This maximum pressure was estimated based on pump test data presented in CVI 1750253. 
The Seepex pump is a positive displacement pump rather than a centrifugal pump and, 
consequently, it does not have a pump curve like a centrifugal pump. However, the uncontrolled 
maximurn pump flow rate and the uncontrolled maximum pump discharge pressure can be 
estimated based on the point at which the pump motor is estimated to begin to fail (Le., for the 
uncontrolled case, no credit is taken for the pressure relief valve or amperage limits that are 
normally associated with the pump). The Seepex pump electric motor has a nominal horsepower 
rating of 30 hp, based on Seepex Quality Inspection Certijkates According to DIN 55 
350-18-4.2.2 (CVI #50253). The point at which motor failure begins is taken to be 115% ofthis 
value (the “nameplate value’?, since typical industry standards (e.g., National Electrical 
Manufacturer’s Association Safety Standard and Guidefor Selection, Installation. and Use of 
Electric Motors and Generators, MG2-2001) specify that operation up to 1 15% of nominal 
rating shall not have an immediate damaging effect on motor operation. 1 15% of 30 HP = 
34.5 hp. This is the point for which maximum pump pressure and maximum pump flow rate are 
estimated. 
The 34.5 hp produces a maximum pump speed of approximately 650 rpm in a no backpressure 
condition. Based on 650 rpm, a maximum flow rate of approximately 521 gaUrnin is estimated 
by extrapolation of the pump performance curves in Seepex Operating and Maintenance 
Instruction for Progressive Cavity Pump BE 55-24, Serial Numbers 806306 and 806307, 
Section 9 -Auxiliary Documentation. 
Based on pump test data included in vendor file CVI #50253 34.5 hp motor operation suggests a 
maximum pump pressure of approximately 480 lb/in2 gauge. 
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Onsite radiological exposure 
Onsite toxicological exposure 
RPP-17965 F S V  5 
DSA 480 Ib/in2 gauge pressure 
Moderate risk bin”’ 
High risk bin’’’ 
Moderate risk bin‘” 
High risk bid3’ 
As Table 4-2 indicates, the maximum flow rate for the Seepex pump is bounded by the DSA 
assumed maximum flow rate, while the maximum pressure may not be bounded. However, 
recalculation of the bounding onsite and offsite radiological and toxicological consequences 
using the waste properties from Table 4-1, together with an assumed 480 lb/in2 gauge pump 
pressure, produces the following results (Table 4-3). 
Table 4-3. Seepex Pump Maximum Pressure Exposure Comparison. 
1 Offsite radiological exposure I 1.4E- 1 r ed2’  I 9.632 red3’ I I Offsite toxicological exposure I Low risk bin‘” I Low risk bid3’ 
Notes: 
DSA =documented safety analysis. 
(I’ RPP- 13750, Waste Transfer Leaks Technical Basis Document. 
( 2 )  RPP-14499, Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Waste Transfer Leak. 
(3) Based on the same calculational methodology as described for the fine spray accident scenario analyses in 
Calculations of the results for 480 Ibiin’ gauge pressure are contained in the following Excel spreadsheets: 
RPP-13750 and RPP-14499. 
Fine Spray 8hr 0% 48Opsig (9-28-03).xls 
Fine Spray 8hr 7% 480 psi$ (9-28-03).xls 
Fine Spray Bhr IS% 480 psig (9-28-03).xls 
Fine Spray 8hr 25% 480psig (9-28-03).xIs 
Fine Spray Ogsite 8hr 0% 480psIg (9-28-03).~1s 
Fine Spray Offsite 8hr 7% 480 psig (9-28-03).xIs 
Fine Spray Offsite 8hr 13% 4ROpsig (9-28-O3).xIs 
Fine Spray Offsite 8hr 25% 480 psig (9-28-03).xls 
(note thaf 30 voi% cases were not required because ihe maximum dose values occurred for vol%’s less than 
2s Wl%) 
Based on the information in Table 4-3, a maximum pump pressure of 480 lb/in2 gauge would 
produce consequences that are bounded by the current DSA analysis. 
Based on informal discussion with the Seepex pump vendor, it is possible that a pressure spike 
greater than 480 lb/in2 gauge may occur for a short period of time. If the pressure is high enough 
(on the order of 2,000 Ib/in2 gauge to 3,000 lb/in2 gauge) and a leak occurs, the offsite evaluation 
guideline could be exceeded. However, this would require a fine crack that has optimal width 
for producing fine spray to form and be maintained for an 8 hr period. If such a crack did occur, 
it is very likely that it would quickly expand due to erosion by the high pressure of the leaking 
fluid. As the width of the crack increases from the optimal width for spray production, the 
amount of respirable size aerosol particles produced decreases rapidly, and the leak begins to 
more closely resemble the large pipe break into a pit scenario. Consequently, it is qualitatively 
judged that, even if a leak occurred at a pressure much higher than 480 Iblin2 gauge and a crack 
occurs that has the optimal width for production of fine aerosol, this crack configuration would 
not exist for an extended period of time (Le., 8 hr is assumed in the DSA analysis) and offsite 
radiological consequences would not challenge guidelines. Also, the leak scenario would 
become more like a large break scenario as the crack width increases due to erosion. For large 
break scenarios, the maximum pump flow rate is more important for determining consequences 
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than the maximum pump pressure. As noted in Table 4-2, the maximum flow rate of the Seepex 
pump is bounded by the maximum flow rate assumed in the DSA. Also, the Seepex pump 
includes a relief valve. No credit is taken for this relief valve when estimating uncontrolled 
radiological and toxicological consequences. However, this relief valve is considered a defense- 
in-depth feature for mitigation of accident scenarios involving high pump pressures. Vendor 
information file CVI #50253 includes documentation from the manufacturer indicating that the 
valve is pressure tested to meet or exceed the pertinent requirements of ASME B&PV Code 
Section VIII, Division 1, subsections UG-125 through UG-136. 
4.1.4.3 Safety SSCs and TSR Controls 
The discussion presented in Section 4.1.4.2 indicates that waste transfer leak accident scenarios 
associated with modified sluicing are bounded by those currently addressed in the DSA. 
Therefore, the controls specified in the TSRs for the waste transfer leak accident as analyzed in 
the DSA also provide adequate risk reduction to allow modified sluicing operations to be 
conducted safely. The current controls for waste transfer leak accident scenarios specified in the 
TSRs are as follows: 
0 LCO 3.1.1, ‘‘Transfer Leak Detection Systems” 
LCO 3.1.2, “Backflow Prevention Systems” 
0 AC 5.7, “Safety Management Programs” 
AC 5.8, “Emergency Preparedness” 
AC 5.1 1, ‘Transfer Controls “ 
AC 5.12, “Administrative Lock Controls.” 
Applicable safety-significant SSCs include: 
Transfer Leak Detection Systems 
Hose-in-hose Transfer Line Systems 
0 Aboveground Transfer System Vehicle Barriers (if used to comply with AC 5.1 1) 
Service Water Pressure Detection Systems (if used to comply with LCO 3.1.2) 
Backflow Preventers (if used to comply with LCO 3.1.2). 
It is assumed in this analysis that all transfer lines used for modified sluicing will be either 
underground or, if aboveground, will be safety-significant HIHTL systems. 
As noted above, the relief valve installed on the Seepex positive displacement pump will be 
treated as a defense-in-depth feature. 
4.1.4.4 Conclusions 
The waste transfer leak accident scenarios associated with modified sluicing are bounded by 
those currently addressed in the DSA. Therefore, the controls specified in the TSRs for the 
waste transfer leak accident as analyzed in the DSA also provide adequate risk reduction for 
waste transfer leak accidents associated with modified sluicing operations. 
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4.2 EVALUATION OF RISK FROM MODFIED SLUICING OF 
WASTE FOR DSA CANDIDATE ACCIDENTS NOT SELECTED 
AS REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS 
4.2.1 Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Releases 
4.2.1.1 DSA Representative Accident 
There is no DSA representative accident because HEPA filter failures from exposure to high 
temperature or pressure were analyzed and binned in Risk Bin III OZpP-13437, Technical Basis 
Document for Ventilation System Filtration Failures Leading to Unfiltered Release). The 
analyses assume an event that results in failure of all prefilters, HEPA filters, and other filters 
(i.e., high-efficiency mist eliminators and high-efficiency gas adsorbers) present in the 
ventilation system. It is further assumed that a fraction of the inventory of tank waste 
accumulated on filters and ventilation system ductwork is released. Failure of the filters results 
in an unfiltered release that also contributes to the consequences of the event. Consequences of 
all HEPA filter failure and unfiltered release scenarios evaluated in RPP-13437 fall into the 
“low” category. 
4.2.1.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Conditions 
SST modified sluicing waste retrieval systems will retrieve waste from designated tanks and 
transfer the retrieved waste to the DST system. The SST modified sluicing waste retrieval 
system is designed to dissolve SST crystallized salt and to mobilize sludge through the 
application of high pressure water or supernatant spray to break down the waste salt, sludge, and 
solids and to direct the waste to the intake of a slurry transfer pump for transfer into the DST 
system. Various SST waste retrieval system sluicing designs may be used. 
The SST waste retrieval system sluicing designs employ sluicing nozzles that are installed in the 
tank headspace via SST risers. The number of sluicing nozzles can vary depending on the 
amount and location of solidified waste within the SST. The nozzle system is designed to aim 
pressurized fluid (raw water or supernatant) that will break up, mobilize, and move the sludge 
and compacted solids slurry to a location where they are picked up by a slurry transfer pump. 
The SST modified sluicing HAZOP identified potential SST HEPA failures and unfiltered 
releases from various initiators such as moisture buildup, dome cracking, vapor condensation 
resulting in a vacuum, and sluice water evaporation resulting in headspace pressurization. 
Sluicing operations have the potential to increase the aerosol content of the headspace beyond 
what is currently evaluated in the DSA. Therefore the effect of the increased aerosol loading 
requires further evaluation. 
4.2.1.3 Accident Frequency Comparison 
Aerosol generation and moisture buildup causing HEPA filter failure has been previously 
identified and documented in the hazard analysis database. The assigned frequency for these 
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conditions is “anticipated” in RPP-I 3437. Since that is the highest frequency category, the SST 
modified sluicing operations cannot exceed this frequency. 
4.2.1.4 Accident Consequence Comparison 
The source terms (including ULD, ARF, and RF) for HEPA filter failure during SST modified 
sluicing operations would not be different from those currently considered in RPP-13437, since 
the waste composition will not change and the HEPA filter loading parameters remain the same. 
There are no mechanisms during SST modified sluicing operations that would cause an increase 
in the radiological dose or toxicological consequences from the release of material from the 
HEPA filters or ducting during a HEPA filter failure over that analyzed in support of the DSA 
(RPP-I 3437). However, the unfiltered release portion of the event during modified sluicing 
operations was postulated to have consequences higher than those evaluated in RPP- 1343 7 
because of the potentially high aerosol loading in the headspace of the tank being retrieved. 
4.2.1.4.1 Reasonably Conservative Base Case. This case assumes that one ventilation system 
is operating at the maximum ventilation runout flow of a portable exhauster with a variable 
frequency drive at the normal 60 Hz set point (RPP-CALC-24575, Assessment of Maximum 
Ventilation Flow Rates for VFD Driven Portable Exhausters for SST Ventilation). Tank waste 
releases are qualitatively estimated at 10% SST solids and 90% SST liquids from experience 
from sluicing SST 241-C-106 (RPP-19919, Campaign Report for the Retrieval of Waste Heel 
from Tank 241-C-106) and past sluicing campaigns (SD-WM-TI-302, Hanford Waste Tank 
Sluicing ~ i s t o r y ) .  AII aerosol partition fraction o f 2  x 10.’ L waste/L for air lift circulator 
operation is used. This is conservative compared to the measured aerosol partition fraction 
during a waste transfer of 2 x 10.’ L waste/L (RPP-13437). 
4.2.1.4.1.1 Toxicological Consequences of an Unfiltered Release. The aerosol release rate 
can be calculated as follows: 
(1,304 ff‘/min) (1 mid60 sec) (28.3 L/A3) (2 x 1 0-8 L wasten air) 
= 1.23 x lo5 Wsec 
where: 
1,304 ft3/min is the maximum ventilation exhaust flowrate for a portable exhauster for 
SST retrieval ventilation (RPP-CALC-24575) 
28.3 L/ft3 is a conversion factor (Weast 1981, CRCHandbook of Chemistry and Physics) 
2 x L waste/L air is the partition fraction of waste in the headspace air during air lift 
circulator operation which is a conservative selection since the measured partition 
fraction during a waste transfer is 2 x L wastell air (RPP-13437). 
4.2.1.4.1.2 Onsite Toxicological Consequences. Calculating the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for an 
onsite release assuming 10% SST solids and 90% SST liquids: 
(0.90) (5.73 x 10’) +- (0.10) (6.28 x 10‘) = 5.79 x lo8 
4-19 
Page 39 of 143 of DA02557226 
RPP-17965 REV 5 
where: 
5.73 x lo8 is the bounding liquid TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (RPP-8369, 
Chemical Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analysis) 
6.28 x lo8 is the bounding solid TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (WP-8369). 
Calculating the onsite moderate toxicological consequences: 
Onsite, moderate SOF = (aerosol release rate) (onsite x/Q) (TEEL-2 SOF multiplier) 
Onsite, moderate SOF = (1.23 x 10” L/sec) (3.28 x lo-’ sec/m3) (5.79 x 10s)/(l,OOO L/m3> 
= 2.3 x 10.’ 
where: 
3.28 x IO-’ sec/m3 i s  the bounding onsite x/Q for a ground level release (RPP-13482) 
1,000 ~ / m ~  is a volumetric conversion factor. 
4.2.1.4.1.3 Offsite Toxicological Consequences. Calculating the TEEL-1 SOF multiplier for 
an offsite release assuming 10% SST solids and 90% SST liquids: 
(0.90) (3.71 io9) + (0.10) (2.21 io9) = 3.56 io9 
where: 
3.71 x lo9 is the bounding liquid TEEL-1 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (RPP-8369) 
2.21 x io9 is the bounding solid TEEL-1 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (WP-8369). 
Calculating the offsite moderate toxicological consequences: 
Offsite, moderate SOF = (aerosol release rate) (offsite x/Q) (TEEL-1 SOF multiplier) 
Offsite, moderate SOF = (1.23 x lo” L/sec) (2.22 x lo’ sec/m3) (3.56 x 10g)/(l,OOO L/m3) 
= 9.7 x IO4 
where: 
2.22 x lo” sec/m3 is the bounding offsite x/Q for a ground level release (RPP-13482). 
4.2.1.4.1.4 Radiotogical Consequences of an 8-hr Unfiltered Release. The total release over 
the 8-hr period can be found by: 
(1.23 x l o5  L/sec) (60 sedmin) (60 minh) (8 hr) = 3.54 x 10.‘ L 
Calculating the onsite ULD for an onsite release assuming 10% SST sludge and 90% 
supernatant: 
(0.90) (4.5 io2 s a )  -t (0.10) (1.4 lo5 S ~ L )  = 1.4 lo4 s v / ~  
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where: 
4.5 x 10’ Sv/L is the bounding ULD for supernatant in 100-series SSTs (RPP-5924) 
1.4 x 1 O5 Sv/L is the bounding ULD for sludge in 100-series SSTs (RPP-5924). 
Calculating the onsite radiological dose: 
Onsite Dose = (aerosol released) (onsite x/Q) (onsite ULD) (breathing rate) 
Onsite Dose = (3.54 x 10.’ L) (5.58 x 4 3  sec/m3) (1.4 x IO4 SdL) (3.33 x 10- rn /sec) 
= 9.2 10” sv 
= 9.2 x 10’ rem 
where: 
5.58 x 10” sec/m3 is the onsite 8-hr x/Q including plume meander (RPP-13482) 
3.33 x m3/sec is the breathing rate (RPP-5924). 
It can be seen that the consequences for the unfiltered release accident are below the moderate 
risk guidelines (1 .O is the toxicological guideline and 25 rem is the radiological guideline). Even 
when the consequences for the bounding HEPA filter failure are added to the unfiltered release 
the guidelines are not challenged. The contribution to the toxicological consequences due to 
high pressure failure of the HEPA filters is 3.1 x l o 3  for onsite and 4.2 x 
while the bounding contribution to the radiological consequences is 2.2 x 
The resultant risk bin is 111 for an accident with a frequency of “anticipated.” 
4.2.1.4.2 Sensitivity Case 1 (30% Solids Loading) 
4.2.1.4.2.1 Toxicologicai Consequences of an Unfiltered Release. The aerosol release rate 
can be calculated as follows: 
for offsite releases 
rem (RPP-13437). 
(1,304 ft3/min) (1 mid60 sec) (28.3 L/ft3) (2 x 10” L waste/L air) 
= 1.23 x 1 0-5 Wsec 
where: 
1,304 ft3/min is the maximum ventilation exhaust flowrate for a portable exhauster for 
SST retrieval ventilation (RPP-CALC-24575) 
28.3 L/ft3 is a conversion factor (Weast 1981) 
2 x 10.’ L waste/L air is the partition fraction of waste in the headspace air during air lift 
circulator operation which is a conservative selection since the measured partition 
fraction during a waste transfer is 2 x L waste/L air (RPP-13437). 
4.2.1.4.2.2 Onsite Toxicological Consequences. Calculating the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for an 
onsite release assuming 30% SST solids and 70% SST liquids (RPP-13437): 
(0.70) (5.73 x 10’) + (0.30) (6.28 x IO8) = 5.89 x lo8 
4-21 
Page 41 of 143 of DA02557226 
WP-17965 REV 5 
where: 
5.73 x 10' is the bounding liquid TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for 1 00-series SSTs 
(FWP-8369) 
6.28 x lo8 is the bounding solid TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (RPP-8369). 
Calculating the onsite moderate toxicological consequences: 
Onsite, moderate SOF = (aerosol release rate) (onsite x/Q) (TEEL-2 SOF multiplier) 
Onsite, moderate SOF = (1.23 x Usec) (3.28 x lo-* sec/m3) (5.89 x 108)/(1,000 Urn3) 
= 2.4 x 10.' 
where: 
3.28 x 
I ,000 urn3 is a volumetric conversion factor. 
sec/m3 is the bounding onsite x/Q for a ground level release (RPP-13482) 
4.2.1.4.2.3 Offsite Toxicological Consequences. Calculating the TEEL-1 SOF multiplier for 
an offsite release assuming 30% SST solids and 70% SST liquids (WP-13437): 
(0.70) (3.71 x lo9) + (0.30) (2.21 x IO9) = 3.26 x lo9 
where: 
3.71 x lo9 is the bounding liquid TEEL-1 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (WP-8369) 
2.21 x lo9 is the bounding solid TEEL-1 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (RPP-8369). 
Calculating the offsite moderate toxicological consequences: 
Offsite, moderate SOF = (aerosol release rate) (offsite x/Q) (TEEL-1 SOF multiplier) 
Offsite, moderate SOF (1.23 x Lkec) (2.22 x sec/m3) (3.26 x 109)/(1000 Vm3) 
= 8.9 x lo4 
where: 
2.22 x sec/m3 is the bounding offsite x/Q for a ground level release (RPP-13482). 
4.2.1.4.2.4 Radiological Consequences of an 8-hr Unfiltered Release. The total release over 
the 8-hr period can be found by: 
(1.23 x L/sec) (60 sec/min) (60 minih) (8 hr) = 3.54 x lo-' L 
CaIculating the onsite ULD for an onsite reIease assuming 30% SST sludge and 70% supernatant 
OIpP-13437): 
(0.70) (4.5 x lo2 SvL) + (0.30) (1.4 x lo5 Sv/L) = 4.2 x lo4 Sv/L 
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Page 42 of 143 of DA02557226 
WP-17965 REV 5 
where: 
4.4 x IO2 Sv/L is the bounding ULD for supernatant in 100-series SSTs (RPP-5924) 
1.4 x lo5 Sv/L is the bounding ULD for sludge in 100-series SSTs (RF’P-5924). 
Calculating the onsite radiological dose: 
Onsite Dose = (aerosol released) (onsite x/Q) (onsite ULD) (breathing rate) 
Onsite Dose = (3.54 x IO-’ L) (5.58 x IO” sec/m3) (4.2 x IO4 Sv/L) (3.33 x 10- m /sec) 4 3  
= 2.8 x lo-’ Sv 
= 2.8 rem 
where: 
5.58 x 
3.33 x 10- m /sec is the breathing rate (RF’P-5924). 
sec/m3 is the onsite 8-hr x/Q including plume meander (RPP-13482) 
4 3  
It can be seen that the consequences for the unfiltered release accident are below the moderate 
risk guidelines (1 .O is the toxicological guideline and 25 rem is the radiological guideline). Even 
when 30% SST solids are assumed and the consequences for the bounding HEPA filter failure 
are added to the unfiltered release the guidelines are not challenged. The contribution to the 
toxicological consequences due to high pressure failure of the HEPA filters is 3.1 x IO5 for 
onsite and 4.2 x for offsite releases while the bounding contribution to the radiological 
consequences is 2.2 x lo4 rem (RPP-13437). The resultant risk bin is 111 for an accident with a 
frequency of “anticipated.” 
4.2.1.4.3 Sensitivity Case 2 (Maximum Allowable Ventilation Flow Rate). The purpose of 
this sensitivity case is to back calculate the maximum ventilation flow rate during modified 
sluicing operations that is within the DSA guidelines. This is done by calculating the aerosol 
release rate using the onsite moderate guideline SOF of 1 and then calculating the maximum 
ventilation flow rate. 
The aerosol release rate is calculated by: 
Aerosol release rate = (Onsite, moderate SOF) / (onsite x/Q) (TEEL-2 SOF multiplier) 
Aerosol release rate = (1) (1,000 L/m3)/(3.28 x lo-’ sec/m3) (5.79 x 10’) 
= 5.27 x 1 O-’ L/sec 
where: 
3.28 x 10” sec/m3 is the bounding onsite x/Q for a ground level release (WP-13482) 
1,000 urn3 is a volumetric conversion factor. 
5.79 x 10’ is the TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for an onsite release assuming 10% SST solids 
and 90% SST liquids (RPP-13437): 
(0.90) (5.73 x 10’) + (0.10) (6.28 x lo8) = 5.79 x 10’ 
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where: 
5.73 x lox is the bounding liquid TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs 
(RPP-8369) 
6.28 x 10' is the bounding solid TEEL-2 SOF multiplier for 100-series SSTs (RPP-8369). 
The maximum ventilation flow rate is: 
= 5.26 x IO" LJsec / (1 mini60 sec) (28.3 L/ft3) (2 x 
= 5.600 R3/min 
L waste/L air) 
where: 
28.3 L/ft3 is a conversion factor (Weast 1981) 
2 x 10' L waste/L air is the partition fraction ofwaste in the headspace air during air lift 
circulator operation which is a conservative selection since the measured partition 
fraction during a waste transfer is 2 x lo-' L wastea air (RPP-13437). 
4.2.1.5 Safety SSCs and TSR Controls 
Currently the DSA has no TSR-level controls for HEPA filter failures or unfiltered releases, nor 
are any additional controls required for SST modified sluicing conditions. Since SST modified 
sluicing conditions remain Risk Bin 111, they do not require the identification of additional 
controls beyond existing SMPs. 
4.2.1.6 Conclusions 
Filtration system failure accidents that could be initiated during SST modified sluicing 
operations are adequately analyzed and bounded by conditions currently identified in the hazards 
analysis database and the DSA technical basis documents. No additional controls are necessary. 
Sensitivity cases show that the conclusions are not very sensitive to ventilation flow rate and 
percent solids. 
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5.0 CONTROLS 
Based on the hazard and accident analysis of modified sluicing operations, no new accidents 
were identified, and the existing DSA analyses were found to be encompassing and bounding. 
The DSA controls @e., safety SSCs and TSRs) were also found to acceptably prevent or mitigate 
potentia1 hazardous conditions and postulated accidents for modified sluicing operations. 
Although the waste transfer spray leak accident caused by the high pressures possible with 
progressive cavity pumps was determined to be bounded by the DSA analysis and mitigated by 
the selected DSA controls (e.g., waste transfer-associated covers) and additional defense-in- 
depth feature was identified for this accident scenario. The defense-in-depth feature is the 
pressure limiter (e.g., pressure relief valve) for progressive cavity pumps that is designed to 
prevent pressures exceeding the design pressure of the waste transfer system. 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFINITIONS 
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Definitions of information listed in Table 3-X and C-1 : 
ID: The item identification (ID); used to record a unique identifier for the hazardous 
condition. 
Node: The division of a process or activity into discrete segments is called a node. Each 
node represents a specific part of the process or activity. This division into nodes is 
designed to facilitate the hazard identification process. 
Process Variable: The characteristics of a process, such as flow, pressure, or 
temperature, which are used to define proper operation. 
Deviation: The deviation is the description of the divergence from the desired value for 
a given process variable, such as “low temperature” to describe temperature below 
normal or optimum. 
Hazardous Condition: The hardware failures, operational faults, or conditions that 
could result in undesired consequences. The Hazardous Condition is a concise statement 
combining the Cause, Consequence, and Mode of radioactive material release. 
Possible Causes of Deviation: The causes that lead to the deviation from the process 
variable and resultant Hazardous Condition. 
Consequence: The potential consequences that could result from the postulated 
deviation. 
Potential Engineered Features: Potential SSCs are existing engineered features 
(hardware items) identified by the hazard and operability study (HAZOP) team that have 
the potential to mitigate or prevent the hazardous condition of concern. The engineered 
features are candidates for designation as safety-significant items for hazardous 
conditions that pose a significant threat to the health of facility workers and onsite 
personnel or safety class for hazards that pose a significant threat to offsite individuals. 
These items should not be construed as being the “official” controls that would 
eventualIy be credited in the safety basis. 
Potential Administrative Controls: Technical safety requirements are existing controls 
identified by the HAZOP team that have the potential to mitigate or prevent the 
hazardous condition of concern. These items should not be construed as being the 
“official” administrative features that would eventually be credited in the safety basis. 
NC Consequence Category (NC Offsite Rad, NC Offsite Tox, NC Onsite Rad, NC 
Onsite Tox, NC F W  Cons): The consequence category is a code designator for the level 
of safety consequence associated with a specific class of receptor, material of concern 
(radioactive or toxic material), and the hazardous condition. The consequence 
assignment is a “first cut,” qualitative estimate of the safety severity of the consequences 
assuming no controls are present. The criteria for determining the consequence 
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on people or the environs. 
>lo0 rem TEDE or 
>ERPG-~ITEEL -3 
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X5 rem TEDE or 
>ERPG-Z/TEEL-2 
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All facility worker 
hazards are assessed 
for prompt death 0' 
serious injury or 
significant 
radiological or 
chemical exposure. 
designation is unique to the receptor. For the Offsite and Onsite receptor the 
consequence designators are low (L), moderate (M), and high (H). The facility worker 
(FW) is assigned a Y or N based on whether the postulated event is estimated to result in 
severe injury or death. Y indicates there is a potential for significant FW impact and N 
indicates no potential. Table B-1 summarizes the criteria for Offsite receptors, Onsite 
receptors, and facility workers: 
Table B-l . Consequence Levels and Risk Evaluation Guidelines. 
Consequence 
level 
r 
I
Notes: 
Offsite public 
Considerable offsite impacts 
on people or the environs. 
225 rem TEDE or 
2ERPG-ZITEEL-2 
Only minor offsite impact on 
people or the environs. 
>I rem TEDE or 
>ERPG- UTEEL-1 
Negligible offsite impact on 
people or the environs. 
4 rem or 
<ERPG-llTEEL-l 
Onsite co-located worker 1 Site facility worker 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline. 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent. 
TEEL = Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
ENV Cons. The environmental consequence ranking is a "first cut," qualitative estimate 
of the environmental severity of the hazardous condition assuming no controls are 
present. The following system is used: 
EO 
El 
E2 
No significant environmental effect outside the facility confinement systems. 
Limited environmental discharge of hazardous material outside the facility. 
Large environmental discharge of hazardous material within the plant site 
boundary. 
Significant environmental discharges of hazardous material outside the plant site 
boundary. 
E3 
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NC Frequency: The NC frequency is a "first cut," qualitative estimate of the likelihood 
of the hazardous condition assuming no controls are present. The following system is 
used: 
A 
U 
EU 
BEU 
Events that are expected to occur one or more times during the lifetime of the 
facility, categorized as "anticipated" events. The frequency range associated with 
this category i s  9 lE-O2/yr. 
Events that could occur during the lifetime of the facility, but with low 
probability. Such events are categorized as "unlikely" and fall in the range of 
1 E-M/y to 1 E - 0 2 / ~ ~ .  
Events not expected to occur during the lifetime of the facility, categorized as 
"extremely unlikely." The frequency range associated with this category is 
1 E - 0 6 / ~  to 1E-OWy. 
Events categorized as "beyond extremely unlikely," with a frequency less than 
1E-O6/yr. Events in this category (such as meteor strike) are so unlikely they 
generally do not require special controls. 
Remarks: Miscellaneous observations or clarifying comments for a given item. 
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APPENDIX D 
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SLUICING IN SINGLE-SHELL TANK 241-S-102 WITH 
DOUBLE-SHELL TANK 241-SY-102 SUPERNATANT 
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D1.O PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
D1.1 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this appendix is to determine if the potential risk associated with using double- 
shell tank (DST) supernatant to sluice single-shell tanks (SST) for retrieval of the SSTs in the 
tank farms is adequately addressed and bounded by the tank farms safety basis (RPP-13033, 
Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis [DSA], and HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms 
Technical Safety Requirements [TSR]) and to determine if additional controls may be required. 
D1.2 SCOPE 
The scope of this appendix is the SST modified sluicing waste retrieval system design that is 
planned for SST 241-S-102 with use of supernatant from DST 241-SY-102. Note that the 
general modified sluicing design has been previously evaluated in the main body of this 
document and this attachment only focuses on the unique aspects of using supernatant from DST 
241-SY-102 for sluicing. Although this safety evaluation is based on the specific design for SST 
241-S-102 retrieval to DST 241-SY-102, the design for use of supernatant as asluice medium 
could be used in future SST retrievals. When the system designs and processes for the retrieval 
of these subsequent SSTs are established, the analysis contained in this appendix will be 
reviewed via the unreviewed safety question process to determine whether this analysis 
satisfactorily bounds the retrievals from these tanks. 
D2.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE SUPERNATANT 
SLUICING DESIGN AND PROCESS 
SST modified sluicing waste retrieval systems will retrieve waste from designated tanks to the 
extent needed for tank closure and transfer. The retrieved waste will be transferred to the DST 
system. The SST modified sluicing waste retrieval system is designed to dissolve SST 
crystallized salt andlor to mobilize sludge through the application of high pressure water or 
supernatant spray to break down the waste salt, sludge, and solids and to direct the waste to the 
intake of a slurry transfer pump for transfer into the DST system. Various SST waste retrieval 
system sluicing designs may be used. The designs may use sluice nozzles, DST supernatant 
pump, SST supernatant pump, waste transfer pump(s), monitoring and control systems, portable 
exhauster ventilation, and new as well as existing waste transfer systems. Support systems 
necessary for the sluicing design may include raw water and electrical supply. 
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The sluicing design attributes unique to using DST 241-SY-102 supernatant as a sluice medium 
for retrieval of SST 241-S-102 are as follows. 
A supernatant pump is in DST 241-SY-102 that uses an existing underground transfer 
line to pump to the 241-SY-A valve pit, where it is then routed via a hose-in-hose transfer 
line (HIHTL) to the common riser extension (i.e., an aboveground waste-transfer 
associated structure located on top ofriser) at riser 14 on SST 241-S-102. The 
supernatant is then introduced into the SST through electrically controlled sluice nozzles 
in riser 14 or redirected to sluice nozzle riser extensions in risers 1 1  and/or 16 via 
HIHTLs. The DST supematant pump suction floats on the surface of the waste and the 
slurry distributor in the DST for returning retrieved SST waste is located in the 
supernatant to minimize disturbance of the DST settled solids. 
The sluice nozzle riser extensions are equipped with leak detectors and gravity drain 
directly into the SST. The riser extensions will be designed to be able to withstand a 
vehicle collision or vehicle barriers will protect them and the elevated abovegrade 
portions of HIHTLs from vehicle collisions. 
The sluice nozzles are connected to an eIectrically controlled pan and tilt mechanism and 
utilize supernatant or raw water for sluicing. The supernatant pump installed in DST 
241-SY-102 maximum shutoff head and maximum runout are within the bounds of the 
DSA which are approximately 800 ft and approximately 790 galhin, respectively. The 
sluice nozzles are directed from a control station that can be located inside or outside the 
tank farms fence area. 
Raw water is provided for flushing the waste transfer lines and sluice nozzles. A 
backflow prevention system is used to prevent or limit the backflow of waste and ensures 
that no contamination of the raw water supply can occur. 
The HIHTLs are equipped with leak detection at the DST 241-SY-102 central pump pit, 
241-SY-A valve pit, the riser extensions of the SST, and any existing tank farms 
physically connected waste transfer-associated structures. Material balance will be 
performed using waste level readings at DST 241-SY-102 and flow meter measurements 
at the common riser extension (riser 14). Radiation surveys will be relied upon between 
the common riser extension (riser 14) and the riser extensions on risers 11 and 16 to 
detect a waste transfer leak due to a common mode failure or misroute because (1) there 
are no flow metering devices at the riser extensions (risers 1 1  and 16) on the SST, 
(2) liquid level monitoring in the SST is not a reliable method of performing material 
balances in the SST (Le., installed instrumentation locations and waste solid interference 
may not allow the instrumentation to extend to the bottom of the SST), and 
(3) instrument gauges could be damaged during sluicing operations in the SST. 
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D3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
D3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 
The graded approach was used to select the hazard identification and evaluation method. The 
goal of the graded approach is to select a method that does not create a large number of 
hazardous conditions redundant to those in the DSA hazard evaluation database (RF’P-15188, 
Hazard Evaluation Database Report). The “delta” hazard analysis method was chosen. The 
“delta” hazard analysis method uses the concept o f  “deviations fiom a baseline” to identify 
hazardous conditions that require further evaluation. 
D3.2 METHODOLOGY 
SST modified sluicing operations using DST supernatant is an activity that has not been 
approved under the DSA. However, under the previous Basis for Interim OperatiodFinal Safety 
Analysis Report, supernatant for sluicing was authorized via the W-320 project. Therefore, as a 
starting point, the hazardous conditions identified for the W-320 project were reviewed to ensure 
the completeness of the hazard evaluation. A team composed of Nuclear Safety & Licensing, 
Engineering, and Operations systematically evaluated sluicing using DST supernatant with the 
DSA representative and candidate accidents acting as study nodes. The attendance roster is 
included in Attachment D1 to document the presence of each team member. 
D3.3 HAZARDOUS CONDITION SCREENING 
Hazardous conditions involving exposure to radioactive and other hazardous materials were 
assigned a representative accident and/or a candidate accident designator. The representative 
accident designator allows cross reference to the appropriate analysis in the DSA. Candidate 
accident designators allow hazardous conditions to be compared with the hazardous conditions 
contained in the DSA hazard evaluation database. 
Hazardous conditions were screened to determine if they potentially (1) are not represented by a 
DSA Tepresentative OT candidate accident, (2) are similar to, but not bounded by a DSA 
representative or candidate accident, or (3) are similar to and bounded by a DSA representative 
or candidate accident but are unique in regard to phenomena or control applicability. Hazardous 
conditions meeting one or more of these criteria are further evaluated in Chapter 4.0. Only those 
hazardous conditions that are found to meet the screening criteria afler further evaluation are 
incorporated into the DSA hazard evaluation database (see Attachment D2). 
A general concern was identified with regards to the source term assumptions for a11 the DSA 
accident analyses. The specific concern was that the supporting calculations for the accidents 
postulated in the SSTs may have used SST source term values that may be challenged by the 
DST source term values due to the introduction of DST supernatant waste. Therefore, the 
following evaluation was performed. 
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High 
Liquid ULD 
Offsite 
1. All applicable DSA SST accidents were reviewed to verify they used bounding SST 
source terms. 
2. The SST bounding radiological and toxicological liquid source terms were obtained from 
RPP-5924, Radiological Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analysis, Rev. 4, and 
RPP-8369, Chemical Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety Analyses, Rev. 2, as reported 
in Table D- 1 .  
24 I-SY-I 0 1 
241-SY-102 
241-SY-103 
Bounding SST 
3. The DST 241-SY-101,241-SY-102, and 241-SY-103 liquid source terms were obtained 
from RPP 5924, Rev, 4, and RPP-8369, Rev. 2, as reported in Table D-1. 
4. An evaluation was performed for planned operations in DSTs 241-SY-101,241-SY-102, 
and 241-SY-103 to confirm that there are no planned waste transfers into these DSTs 
other than the sluicing retrieval operations for SSTs 241-S-102 and 241-S-112. The 
sluicing retrieval operations of SSTs 2414-102 and 241-S-112 will only create more and 
more dilute supernatant each time the 241-SY DST is filled up and the supernatant is 
used for sluicing the SST 241-S-102. Additionally it can be assumed that only the most 
dilute DST supernatant will be used because it will be skimmed off the top of the DST 
waste via a flex and float supernatant pump. This verifies that the liquid source terms 
obtained from RPP 5924, Rev. 4, and RPP-8369, Rev. 2, are worst case source terms that 
could be introduced into 2414-102. 
6.5E+01 4.7EM1 1.39EN9 1.78E+08 5.89E+06 
6.44E+06 6.8E+01 6.2E+01 1.47Et-09 1.91E+08 
1.2E+02 8.8E+01 2.44E+09 3. I OE+O& 9.4 1E+06 
4.5EN2 6.OEi02 3.71E+09 5.73E+08 1.258+07 
(241 -U-106) (241-U-106) (24 1 -A-1 06) (241-A-106) (241-A-106) 
5 .  A comparison of the DST liquid source terms with SST bounding source terms was 
made. 
Table D-1. Liquid Unit Liter Doses and Sum of Fractions for 241-S-102 Waste Transfer. 
The conclusion from this evaluation is that all SST accidents associated with modified sluicing in 
an SST bound the DST 241-SY-101,241-SY-102, and 241-SY-103 liquid source terms and, 
therefore, this concern is not evaluated further in this document. 
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Representative Accident 1, Flammable Gas Accidents (Candidate Accidents 04/05) 
Hazardous conditions involving steady-state flammable gas releases and flammable gas release 
events (spontaneous and induced) were identified for SST sluicing operations using DST 
supernatant (i.e., the addition of DST waste to an SST). Review of these hazardous conditions 
determined that they were represented by existing hazardous conditions and bounded by the 
existing flammable gas accident analysis. The existing controls (safety structures, systems, and 
components [SSC] and TSR) were also determined to be applicable to prevent the postulated 
flammable gas accidents. Therefore, this representative accident is not evaluated further in this 
document. 
Representative Accident 2, Nuclear Criticality (Candidate Accident 01) 
Hazardous conditions involving nuclear criticality are identified in the DSA and are 
representative of hazardous conditions for this activity. The nuclear criticality safety 
management program has been identified in the DSA as the control to ensure that a nuclear 
criticality event remains “beyond extremely unlikely.” The nuclear criticality safety program 
will review sluicing with supernatant and, if necessary, establish any required controls in tank 
farm procedures (e.g., criticality prevention specification). Therefore, this representative 
accident is not evaluated further in this document. 
Representative Accident 13, Waste Transfer Leak (Candidate Accidents 33A, 33C, 33D) 
Hazardous conditions involving waste leaks were identified as having characteristics similar to 
the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard evaluation database. With respect to controls, 
however, it was identified that a material balance could not be performed that would detect waste 
leaks in all waste transfer route sections or detect all potential misroutes. Therefore, material 
balance controls were identified as needing to be further evaluated (see Section 4.1.1). 
Additionally, the supernatant waste transfer design was evaluated to verify that the configuration 
for a siphon event that could overfill a tank is “beyond extremely unlikely.” The siphon event 
was a concern because the waste transfer slurry distributor is located below the waste surface and 
the sluice nozzles are located towards the bottom of SST 241-S-102. Based on 
RPP-CALC-23558, Tank 241-S-102 Retrieval Overfill Due To Siphoning Calculation, the siphon 
event is “beyond extremely unlikely” and, therefore, no further evaluation is required. 
IdentzjiabIe to a Candidate Accident but DSA Hazardous Conditions Determined to be Risk 
Bin I12 or IV(i.e., no Representative Accident identzjied), Tank Bump (Candidate 
Accident 18A) 
Hazardous conditions involving tank bump are identified in the DSA and are representative of 
hazardous conditions for this activity. Waste transfer controls have been established in the DSA 
to ensure that tank bump remains “beyond extremely unlikely.” Therefore this representative 
accident is not evaluated further in this document. 
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D4.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
D4.1 EVALUATION OF RISK FROM SLUICING WITH DOUBLE-SHELL TANK 
SUPERNATANT FOR DSA REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS 
D4.1.1 Waste Transfer Leaks 
D4.1.1.1 DSA Representative Accidents 
The DSA-related representative accident is the “large pipe break into a pit” scenario. The large 
pipe break into a pit scenario assumes that a large pipe break has occurred, and that waste is 
leaking into an open pit at the maximum flow rate of the transfer pump. DSA Section 3.3.2.4.13, 
“Waste Transfer Leak,” addresses this hazardous condition. 
D4.1.1.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Condition 
Based on the hazard identification and evaluation in Chapter 3.0, the potential waste transfer leak 
hazards for SST sluicing operations using DST supernatant are represented by existing hazardous 
conditions and bounded by existing waste transfer leak analysis. However, further evaluation of 
TSR Administrative Control (AC) 5.1 I key element 5.1 1.2.b. 1, “Material Balance,” is needed 
because the implementation of the material balance controls for SST sluicing operations using 
DST supernatant is not possible or practicable for some sections of the planned waste transfer 
route. 
For example, material balance monitoring covering all waste transfer route sections may not be 
possible during SST waste retrieval because of potential damage to SST waste level monitoring 
instrumentation during sluicing operations or because the location of SST waste level monitoring 
instrumentation or waste solid interference prevents accurate measurements when the SST waste 
volume is low. Material balance monitoring may also not be practical when there are significant 
as Iow as reasonably achievable (ALARA) concerns involving the installation, maintenance, or 
repair of instrumentation required for material balance monitoring (e.g., flow instrumentation) in 
contaminated waste transfer-associated structures. In addition, installing instrumentation 
required for performing material balance monitoring at the end of all waste transfer route 
sections may not be practical from an engineering perspective for waste transfer route sections 
that have no or limited misroute potential and where an alternative control equivalent to material 
balance monitoring is available. An example is the multiple HIHTL sections of an SST waste 
retrieval system between the waste transfer-associated structure located on or near the SST and 
the SST riser extensions or structures containing sluice nozzles. In this example, flow 
instrumentation would only be provided in the waste transfer-associated structure on or near the 
SST for performing material balance monitoring between this structure and the DST system, and 
radiation surveys would be performed in lieu of material balance monitoring to detect waste 
leaks in the HIHTL sections connecting this structure to the individual SST riser extensions or 
structures containing sluice nozzles. Therefore, the material balance control was revised to allow 
alternate means to detect and respond to waste leaks and misroutes. 
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D4.1.1.3 Conclusions 
An amendment for the DSA and TSRs has been developed to revise the material balance control 
(AC 5.1 1 key element 5.1 1.2.b.l). The revision allows for alternate material baIance controls to 
be used for SST retrieval waste transfers when it is not possible or practical for material balance 
monitoring to detect waste leaks in all waste transfer route sections. Radiation surveys must be 
performed for sections of the waste transfer route where the material balance cannot detect waste 
leaks and there must be alternative methods to material balance monitoring for detecting 
misroutes. 
The alternate material balance monitoring controls were selected based on the consensus of the 
decision team which was composed of Nuclear Safety & Licensing, Engineering, and Operations 
personnel. The attendance roster and an e-mail from an operations representative are included in 
Attachment D1 to document the presence of each team member. 
D5.0 CONTROLS 
Based on the hazard and accident analyses of SST modified sluicing in SST 241 -S-102 using 
DST 241-SY-102 Supernatant, no new accidents were identified, and the existing DSA analyses 
were found to be encompassing and bounding. The DSA controls (Le., safety SSCs and TSRs) 
were also found to acceptably prevent or mitigate potential hazardous conditions and postulated 
accidents with the exception of the TSR AC 5.1 1, material balance control (see Section 4.1.1). 
The AC 5.1 1 material balance control was revised to include alternate methods (radiation 
surveys) to detect waste leaks and rnisroutes during SST waste retrieval operations and activities. 
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Hazards Kvaluation Team Meeting Attendance Sheet 
Meeting Subject:-NKJJi I", /t C , d e , / - Q c , J r c  - 
Date- I Z / / ? / ~  3 
' Name Oryaii i /a tion Phone Mail 
stop 
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From: Hopkins. Gary P 
Sent: 
TO: 
cc: 
Subject: 
Friday, December 19,2003 897 AM 
Smith, Ryan 0, Saueressig, David J 
Burke, Christopher A: Grigsby. J M (Mike); Reichmuth. Curtis R 
RE. Waste Transfer Controls for Supernatant Re-circulation 
Ryan. 
The rad survey is the preferred method for ease of operation and the entire route will be surveyed as a matter of normal 
operations 
.... .Orprial MeSsdge----- 
Fmm: smlm, Ryan D 
Sent: 
10: Sau~~esig,  Davld J 
CE: 
sublscc 
Dave. 
Thursday. December 18.2003 3.08 PM 
BU&, Christolttler A; GnQsby, 1 M (Mike); HOpklN, Gary P 
Waste Tmnsler Cnntmlr tor Stqrrnatant Rearuil8t!m 
Earlier today I conducted a Control Decisian meeting to discuss alternate control strategies for sluicing in C-Farm using 
Supernatant from AN-106 with regards to Waste Transfer Leak Materm1 Balance controls (required to mitigate a common- 
mode failure of the HIHTL). Based on the proposed engineering design there is no way of venfying that the supernatant 
from AN-106 reaches the C-Farm SST between the portable pit and the sluice pits on the SST. Control options that were 
discussed are as follows: 
Radiation Surveys 
Field Walk downs 
Pressure Indicators from instrumentation 
Of these options the two that seemed most reasonable to implement were Rad Surveys {able to detect a large pool) or 
installing Flow meters in the sluice pits. Since the sluice pits tend to be highly contamrnated and are difficult to do 
maintenance work in (ALARA concerns) the control decisim team felt the Rad Surveys would be the better option. 
Additionally the team assumed the operattons staff would be performing surveys anyways so there would be minimal 
impact on resources and cost for implementation. The Rad Surveys would only need to be performed on dedicated 
portions of the HIHTL that don't have flow meter indicators as long as no other waste transfer lines are physically 
connected and the frequency would be consistent with the current Material Balance cuntrol frequency based on pump flow 
rates. ailowing for time to shui down the waste transfer pumps and evacuate personnel. 
Since no one from operations was able to attend the InfStiNg, I woukl like to obtain your concurrence for Operations on 
this decision. If you have any questions please let me know so we can discuss in further detail. 
Thanks 
Ryan D. Smith, N S L  Engineer 
Phont: 372-1383 
Pagcr: 85-9030 
Location: 2704HV/Z00E/EZ 15 (Moil Stop: 57-90> 
E-mail: Ryan-b-Smith@rl.gov 
Visual inspection of sluice medium in SST by Camera systems 
Flow meters in sluice pits 
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APPENDIX E 
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SLUICING IN SINGLE-SHELL TANK 241-C-103 WITH 
DOUBLE-SHELL TANK 241-AN-106 SUPERNATANT 
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E1.O PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
El.1 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this appendix is to determine if the potential risk associated with using double- 
shell tank (DST) supernatant to sluice single-shell tanks (SST) for retrieval of the SSTs in the 
tank farms is adequately addressed and bounded by the tank farms safety basis (RPP-13033, 
Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis [DSA], and HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms 
Technical Safety Requirements [TSR]) and to determine if additional controls may be required. 
E1.2 SCOPE 
The scope of this appendix is the SST modified sluicing waste retrieval system design that is 
planned for SST 241-C-103 with use of supernatant from DST 241-AN-106. Note that the 
general modified sluicing design has been previously evaluated in the main body of this 
document and the sluicing design with DST supernatant in 241-S-102 has been previously 
evaluated in Appendix D of this document. This attachment only focuses on the unique aspects 
ofthe 241-C-103 design and the use of Supernatant h m  DST 241-AN-106 for sluicing. 
Although this safety evaluation is based on the specific design for SST 241-C-103 retrieval to 
DST 241-AN-106, this design could be used in future SST retrievals. When the system designs 
and processes for the retrieval of these subsequent SSTs are established, the analysis contained in 
this safety evaluation, including this appendix will be reviewed via the unreviewed safety 
question process to determine whether this analysis satisfactorily bounds the retrievals from 
these tanks. 
E2.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE SUPERNATANT 
SLUICING DESIGN AND PROCESS 
SST modified sluicing waste retrieval systems will retrieve waste from designated tanks to the 
extent needed for tank closure and transfer. The retrieved waste will be transferred to the DST 
system. The SST modified sluicing waste Ietrieval system is designed to dissolve SST 
crystallized salt and/or to mobilize sludge through the application of high pressure water or 
supernatant spray to break down the waste salt, sludge, and solids and to direct the waste to the 
intake of a slurry transfer pump for transfer into the DST system. Various SST waste retrieval 
system sluicing designs may be used. The designs may use sluice nozzles, DST supernatant 
pump, SST supematant pump, waste transfer pump(s), monitoring and control systems, portable 
exhauster ventilation, and new as well as existing waste h s f e r  systems. Support systems 
necessary for the sluicing design may include raw water and electrical supply. 
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The sluicing design attributes unique to using DST 241-AN-106 supernatant as a sluice medium 
for retrieval of SST 241-C-103 are as follows. 
Supernatant is pumped from DST 241-AN-106 through a hose-in-hose transfer line 
(HIHTL) to the 241 -C Tank Farm portable valve and instrument pit where it will be 
routed to the sluicer nozzles in the SSTs through other sections of HIHTL. The 
supernatant pump is a Floway centrifugal pump. The pumping performance has been 
evaluated and determined to be bounded by the DSA using the pumping curves in 
RPP-19618, AN-106 Supernatant Pump Process Flow for C-103 Sluicing. 
The portable valve and instrument pit is located in 241-C Tank Farm and is a fully 
abovegrade assembly that serves the same function as a belowgrade valve pit. The 
portable valve and instrument pit does not drain directly to an SST, therefore, a sump 
pump provides the mechanism to pump waste through one of the HIHTLs to the SST in 
the case of a leak. Leak detectors are located in the pit. Vehicle barriers will protect it 
and the abovegrade portions of hoses from vehicle collisions. 
The sluice nozzles, located in the SST 241-C-103 sluice and pump pits, are connected to 
a hydraulically controlled pan and tilt mechanism and utilize supernatant or raw water for 
sluicing. The SST retrieval pump is a Gorman-Rupp' centrifugal pump located in the 
heel pit. The pumping perfonnance has been evaluated and determined to be bounded by 
the DSA using the pumping curves in RPP-19621, C-I03 Slurry Pump Process Flow 
Calculation. 
0 
The raw water connection for flushing or sluicing is located on a skid outside the portable 
valve and instrument pit. Two waste transfer system valves will provide physical 
disconnection of the raw water line where it exits the portable valve and instrument pit. 
Transfer leak detection systems are installed at the DST 241-AN-IO6 central pump pit, 
241-C Tank Farm portable valve and instrument pit, heel pit, sluice pit, and pump pit. 
The leak detectors located in the sluice and pump pits (where there is potential for 
hydraulic oil to be present) are TraceTek' leak detector systems that use electrical 
conductivity probes that remain operable in Mobile, Quaker Quintolubric 8-33-EHC, and 
Shell Tellus3 Plus 46 hydTaulic oil (RPP-19524, Hydraulic Fluid Compatibility with 
TraceTek Leak Defection System and Mini-Probe). 
Material balance will be performed by level readings at DST 241-AN-106 and flow meter 
measurements at the 241-C Tank Farm portable valve and instrument pit. There are no 
flow metering devices at the heel pit, sluice pit, or pump pit of the SSTs and liquid level 
monitoring in the SST is not practical or possible. Therefore, radiation survey controls 
(as developed in Appendix D for the 2414-102 design) will be relied upon in addition to 
material balance controls to detect and mitigate a waste transfer leak or misroute. 
' Gonnan-Rupp is a trademark of Gonnan-Rupp Company 
TraceTek is a trademark of Raychem Corporation. 
Tellus is a trademark of Shell Company. 
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0 There is a large elevation difference between SST 241-C-103 and DST 241-AN-106 and, 
therefore, the DST supernatant pump and DST waste discharge drop leg have a siphon 
break to prevent an overfill of SST 241-C-103. 
E3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
E3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFTCATION AND EVALUATION 
The graded approach was used to select the hazard identification and evaluation method. The 
goal of the graded approach is to select a method that does not create a large number of 
hazardous conditions redundant to those in the DSA hazard evaluation database (RPP-15188, 
Hazard Evaluation Database Report). The “delta” hazard analysis method was chosen. The 
“delta” hazard analysis method uses the concept of “deviations from a baseline” to identify 
hazardous conditions that require hrther evaluation. 
E32 METHODOLOGY 
The hazard evaluation performed for the SST 241-(2-103 design is the same one that is 
documented in Appendix D and, therefore, only the unique hazardous conditions associated with 
the SST 241-C-103 to DST 241-AN-106 transfer are included and evaluated in this appendix. 
E3.3 HAZARDOUS CONDITION SCREENING 
Hazardous conditions involving exposure to radioactive and other hazardous materials were 
assigned a representative accident and/or a candidate accident designator. The representative 
accident designator allows cross reference to the appropriate analysis in the DSA. Candidate 
accident designators allow hazardous conditions to be compared with the hazardous conditions 
contained in the DSA hazard evaluation database. 
Hazardous conditions were screened to determine if they potentially (1) are not represented by a 
DSA representative or candidate accident, (2)  are similar to, but not bounded by a DSA 
representative or candidate accident, or (3) are similar to and bounded by a DSA representative 
or candidate accident but are unique in regard to phenomena or control applicability. Hazardous 
conditions meeting one or more of these criteria are further evaluated in Chapter 4.0. Only those 
hazardous conditions that are found to meet the screening criteria after hrther evaluation are 
incorporated into the DSA hazard evaluation database (see Attachment El). 
The same general concern that was identified for SST 241-S-102 in Appendix D with regards to 
the source term assumptions for all the DSA accident analyses was also identified for 241-C-103. 
The specific concern was that the supporting calculations for the accidents postulated in the SSTs 
may have used SST source term values that may be challenged by the DST source term values 
due to the introduction of DST supernatant waste. Since there i s  uncertainty associated with the 
DST 241-AN-106 supernatant waste inventory that may be present at the start of operations of 
E-3 
Page 107 of 143 of DA02557226 
Liquid ULD 
Onsite Tank 
Bounding SST 4.5E+02 
(24 1-U-106) 
RPP-17965 REV 5 
Liquid ULD Liquid SOFs 
Offsite TEEL-I TEEL-2 TEEL-3 
6.OE+02 3.7 1E+09 5.73E+08 1.25E+07 
(24 1 -U-l06) (24 1-A-106) (241 -A-1 06) (24 1-A-I 06) 
SST 241-C-103 retrieval, a TSR control was developed to verify that DST waste additions to 
SSTs are bounded by the source term assumptions used in the accident analysis that are impacted 
by the waste addition. The current bounding 1 00-series SST radiological and toxicological 
liquid source terms obtained from RF'P-5924, Radiological Source Terms for Tank Farms Safety 
Analysis, and RPP-8369, Chemical Source Terns for Tank Farms Safety Analyses, are reported 
in Table E- 1. 
Notes: 
SST = single-shell tank. 
TEEL = 
ULD = unit liter dose. 
Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
Representative Accident 11, Mixing of Incompatible Materials (Candidate Accidents 03/23) 
Hazardous conditions involving mixing of incompatible materials for tank pressurization are 
identified in the DSA and are representative of hazardous conditions for this activity. Hazardous 
conditions involving mixing of incompatible materials for toxic material release were identified 
as potentially being unique to the DST supernatant sluicing design and process and, therefore, a 
further evaluation was determined to be warranted. The specific concerns are due to the organic 
waste composition in the 241-C Tank Farm tanks potentially containing large amounts of 
organics and ammonia that could be released due to sluicing using DST supernatant. 
Representative Accident 13, Waste Transfer Leak (Candidate Accidents 33A, 33C, 33D) 
Hazardous conditions involving waste leaks were identified as having characteristics similar to 
the hazardous conditions in the DSA hazard evaluation database. However, a siphon event due 
to the elevation differences between the SST and DST was identified as a credible accident 
scenario and, therefore, a further evaluation was determined to be warranted. Additionally, the 
waste transfer controls were identified as needing hrther evaluation for the operation of the 
sump pump in the portable aboveground valve and instrument pit and for the operability of 
electrical conductivity probes in the presence of hydraulic fluid that could leak into the sluice 
and pump pits where the SST 241-C-103 sluice nozzles are located. 
Identifiable to a Candidate Accident but DSA Hazardous Conditions Determined io be Risk 
Bin III or N(i.e.,  no Representative Accident identified), Tank Bump (Candidate 
Accident 18A) 
Hazardous conditions involving tank bump were identified as a potentially credible accident 
scenario based on the current DSA accident analysis. Based on RPP-6223, Hanford Waste Tank 
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Bump Accident and Consequence Analysis, if at least one of the following criteria is met a tank 
bump accident is “beyond extremely unlikely.” 
1. Total tank heat load is 5 38,000 Btuih 
2. Non-convective layer thickness is 5 12 in. 
3. supernatant depth is 5 40 in. 
4. The non-condensable gas generation rate in the non-convective layer is sufficiently low, 
such that the ratio of vertical void fraction profile to the neutral buoyant void fraction is 
< 1.0. 
Preliminary analysis based on 241-C Tank Farm retrieval planning as documented in 
RPP-21753, C-Farm 100 Series Tanks, Retrieval Process Flowsheer Description, has identified 
that during 241-C Tank Farm SST retrieval operations the heat load will exceed the 38,000 Btulh 
in DSTs 241-AN-106 and 241-AY-101 and none of the other criteria will be met. Therefore, the 
tank bump accident may become credible. Although waste retrieval operations from SST 
241-C-103 to DST 241-AN-106 will not challenge the 38,000 Btu/h heat load criteria, the 
technical supporting documentation (Le., RPP-6213 and RPP-13438, Technical Basisfor the 
Tank Bump Accident and Associated Representative Hazardous Conditions) and TSR page 
changes that support this change are being submitted with this amendment to raise the DST heat 
load required for a tank bump in support of future 241-C Tank Farm SST retrieval operations. 
E4.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
E4.1 EVALUATION OF RISK FROM SLUICING WITH DOUBLE-SHELL TANK 
SUPERNATANT FOR DSA REPRESENTATIVE ACCIDENTS 
E4.1.1 Mixing of Incompatible Materials 
E4.1.1.1 DSA Representative Accidents 
The related DSA representative accident is 11 (candidate accidents 03 and 23), Mixing of 
Incompatible Materials. The technical basis for the mixing of incompatible materials analysis is 
summarized in DSA Section 3.3.2.4.11, “Mixing of Incompatible Materials.” 
E4.1.1.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Conditions 
The hazard analysis postulated that the addition of DST 241-AN-106 supernatant into the 
organic bearing waste in the 241-C Tank Farm tanks could result in organic vapor releases. 
Tank waste mixing and tank waste conditions were considered in the DSA analysis. Tank waste 
mixing with other tank waste (Le., reactions due to a transfer from one tank to another) do not 
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result in a significant release as discussed in RPP-9689, Offsite Radiological Consequence 
Calculation for the Bounding Mixing of IncompatibIe Materials Accident. The organic waste 
remaining in the tank waste consists of either low volatility solvents or water soluble 
complexants which were shown to be compatible with tank wastes. Therefore, organic vapors 
would not be released in significant quantities due to the addition of sluicing liquid. 
Ammonia releases were also considered in the DSA analysis. Process knowledge and past 
history of the various waste disturbing activities (e.g., waste transfers, remediation of DST 
241-SY-101) has shown the potential to release dissolved ammonia. These releases, while 
shown to be a potential facility worker concern, result in low consequences to the onsite worker 
or offsite public even for waste released into the headspace of a ventilated tank. These situations 
are adequately and appropriately addressed by the industrial hygiene safety management 
program. The analysis also looked at the potential to generate additional ammonia due to the 
addition of caustic solutions (such as the sluicing liquid). It was found that the pH in the tank 
would have to be made extremely basic to reach the saturation point for ammonia release 
(equivalent to 4 M/L of sodium hydroxide in the waste). Using supernatant from DST 
241-AN-106 as a sluicing liquid would not cause the tank waste to be sufficiently basic to result 
in a saturated solution. Even if these conditions are achieved, the release would be below the 
evaluation guidelines resulting in low consequences. 
E4.1.1.3 Conclusions 
The sluicing operations using DST 241-AN-106 supernatant in 241-C Tank Farms are bounded 
by the current hazard and accident analysis and no additional controls are required. 
E4.1.2 Waste Transfer Leaks 
E4.1.2.1 DSA Representative Accidents 
The DSA representative accidents are the “fine spray into the air” scenario and the “large pipe 
break into a pit” scenario. The fine spray into the air scenario assumes that a small width crack 
(the optimal width for producing fine aerosol) has occurred in a waste transfer line, and that 
waste slurry is spraying into the air under maximum available pump pressure. The large pipe 
break into a pit scenario assumes that a large pipe break has occurred, and that waste is leaking 
into an open pit at the maximum flow rate of the transfer pump. DSA Section 3.3.2.4.13, “Waste 
Transfer Leak,” addresses these hazardous conditions. The DSA section also addresses several 
other accident scenarios, but the fine spray into the air and the large pipe break into a pit scenario 
are the limiting scenarios. The DSA estimates the frequency o f  the fine spray into the air 
scenario to be “unlikely,” and the large pipe break into a pit scenario to be “anticipated.” The 
onsite radiological and toxicological guidelines are exceeded for the two representative accident 
scenarios, and safety SSCs and/or TSR controls are required. The offsite radiological and 
toxicological guidelines are not exceeded. 
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E4.1.2.2 Waste Retrieval System Operations Hazardous Conditions 
Based on the hazard identification and evaluation in Chapter 3.0, the potential waste transfer leak 
hazards for SST 241 -C-103 sluicing operations are represented by existing hazardous conditions 
and bounded by existing waste transfer leak analysis. However, further evaluation of waste 
transfer leak TSR controls for three hazardous conditions was required. For additional details 
see RPP-I 3750, Waste Transfer Leak Technical Basis Document. 
The first hazardous condition is a pool leak as a result of a back siphon from DST 241 -AN-106 
to SST 241-C-103. The current DSA assumes a siphoning accident that overflows a waste tank 
is “beyond extremely unlikely” based on existing planned waste transfer configurations in the 
tank farms. The planned waste transfer between SST 241-C-103 and DST 241-AN-106 has the 
potential to siphon supematant waste from DST 241-AN-106 back to SST 241-C-103, which is 
much lower in elevation. Therefore, the design of the DST supernatant pump and DST waste 
discharge drop leg incorporates siphon breaks to prevent this hazardous condition. 
The second hazardous condition is the operation of the sump pump in case of a leak in the 
portable aboveground valve and instrument pit. When a leak is detected in the portable valve 
and instrument pit, the leak detector is considered inoperable and, therefore, the pump must be 
under administrative lock. Therefore, an exception from TSR LCO 3.1.1, “Transfer Leak 
Detection Systems,” was identified for waste transfer-associated structures where the active 
waste transfer pump physically connected to the structure is a sump pump located in the 
structure. Performing a material balance for sump pump transfers of waste out of a waste 
transfer-associated structure are also not possible or practical. Therefore, the following two 
exceptions to AC 5.1 1.2.b.l materia1 balancing monitoring requirement were identified. 
1. Transfers of waste present in a waste transfer-associated structure directly back to the 
underlying tank using a sump pump. 
2. Transfer of < 1,000 gal of waste out of a waste transfer-associated structure using a sump 
pump and connecting waste transfer system to a tank. 
Note: For waste transfers of > 1,000 gal using a waste transfer-associated structure sump pump 
where material balance monitoring is not possible or practical, radiation surveys of the waste 
transfer route and alternative methods for detecting misroutes are required (see Appendix D). 
The third hazardous condition affects the operability of the electrical conductivity probes from 
hydraulic fluid leaks in the sluice and pump pits where the SST 241-C-103 sluice nozzles are 
located. For some types of electrical conductivity probes the presence of hydraulic fluid on the 
electrodes may interfere with the ability to detect a waste leak. However, the TraceTek electrical 
conductivity leak detection system planned for use in the SST 241-C-103 sluice pits has been 
tested and shown not to be affected by hydraulic fluid leaks using Mobile, Quaker Quintolubric 
8-22-EHC, and Shell Tellus Plus 46 hydraulic fluid (RPP-19524). 
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E4.1.2.3 Conclusions 
An amendment for the DSA and TSRs has been developed to (1) add waste transfer system 
siphon breaks as a Design Feature, (2) exempt the operability of the leak detection in waste 
transfer-associated structures where the waste is being pumped out by sump pump, (3) provide 
limited exceptions to material balance monitoring requirements when using sump pumps to 
transfer waste from a waste transfer-associated structure, and (4) clarify that electrical 
conductivity probes may be used in waste transfer-associated structures. 
E5.0 CONTROLS 
Based on the hazard and accident analyses of SST modified sluicing in SST 241-C-103 using 
DST 241-AN-106 supernatant, no new accidents were identified, and the existing DSA analyses 
were found to be encompassing and bounding. The DSA controls (Le., safety SSCs and TSRs) 
were also found to acceptably prevent or mitigate potential hazardous conditions and postulated 
accidents with the exception of the exception to TSR LCO 3.1.1, “Transfer Leak Detection 
Systems,” and AC 5.1 1.2.b.l material balance monitoring requirements (see Section D4.1.2) 
during sump pump operation, and the addition of the Design Feature of the waste transfer system 
siphon breaks. 
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APPENDIX F 
SAFETY EVALUATION FOR SODIUM HYDROXIDE ADDITION TO 
SINGLE-SHELL TANK 241-S-112 
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F1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
F1.l PUKPOSE 
The purpose of this appendix is to determine if the potential risk associated with adding sodium 
hydroxide to sluice single-shell tanks (SST) to support waste retrieval is adequately addressed 
and bounded by the tank farms safety basis (RPP-13033, Tank Farms Documented Safety 
Analysis [DSA], and HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements 
[TSR]) and to determine if additional controls may be required. 
F1.2 SCOPE 
The scope of this appendix is the process and design for the sodium hydroxide chemical addition 
to SST 241-S-112 in support of modified sluicing waste retrieval. Note that the general modified 
sluicing design has been previously evaluated in the main body of this document. This 
attachment focuses on the unique aspects of adding sodium hydroxide to SST 241-S-112. 
Although this safety evaluation is based on the specific process and design for adding sodium 
hydroxide to SST 241 -S-l12, this process and design could be used in future 100-series SST 
retrievals. When the system designs and processes for the retrieval of these subsequent SSTs are 
established, the analysis contained in this safety evaluation, including this appendix, will be 
reviewed via the unreviewed safety question process to determine whether this analysis 
satisfactorily bounds the retrievals from these tanks. 
F2.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE SODIUM HYDROXIDE ADDITION TO 
SINGLE-SHELL TANK 241-S-112 
Because most of the brine created during retrieval of saltcake from the SSTs is not within the 
corrosion specification for double-shell tanks (DST), caustic (NaOH) and/or sodium nitrite 
(NaNOz) has to be added. In the past this has been added to the DST prior to receiving the SST 
waste. In order to make beneficial use of  the volume associated with chemical additions to 
retrieve the solids from the SST, it is proposed to introduce the corrosion control chemical 
(sodium hydroxide) into the SST where it can transport insoluble solids as it is pumped to the 
receiving DST. Additionally, if the water insoluble solids in the SST are aluminum oxide 
compounds, the possibility exists that the solids can dissolve in a caustic solution. 
The initial plan for SST 241-S-112 is to add four trucks (nominal 4,500 gal each) of 8 M 
(25 wt %) sodium hydroxide. The 5,000 gal volume of waste currently in SST 241-S-112 is 
assumed to be 45 vol% solids and therefore 55 vol% water. The sodium hydroxide may soak in 
SST 241-S-112 for up to a month and then be transferred to DST 241-SY-102 along with up to 
100,000 gal of sluice water. If the first sodium hydroxide soak is successful in dissolving 
aluminum, more trucks may be added. The remote water lance may be operated using water or 
the sluice nozzles using water or sodium hydroxide to stir the liquid pool and suspend the solids 
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so the resulting slurry can be pumped to DST 241 -SY-102. This soak with chemical application 
may be repeated multiple times until the sodium hydroxide is no longer effective in dissolving 
the aluminum. 
The existing design, equipment, and process for adding bulk chemicals to DSTs are planned for 
the sodium hydroxide addition to SST 241-S-112. Sodium hydroxide is delivered in vendor- 
owned tanker trucks and added directly to the SST. The sodium hydroxide is typically 
introduced into the SST using a pressurized tanker truck via the dilution leg on the transfer pump 
or into the supernatant recirculation pump. Sodium hydroxide may also be introduced via the 
sluice nozzles using the pressurized tanker truck in conjunction with a skid-mounted pump. The 
maximum addition rate of sodium hydroxide is 175 galimin. A flexible hose system delivers the 
sodium hydroxide to the SST using a flow metering device to measure the amount of chemical 
added to the SST. All equipment that may come in contact with the sodium hydroxide has been 
evaluated for compatibility. 
F3.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Bulk chemical additions to SSTs are an activity that is not explicitly described in the DSA. 
However, bulk chemical additions to DSTs, double-contained receiver tanks (DCRT), and catch 
tanks are described in the DSA. Therefore, as a starting point, the hazardous conditions 
identified for bulk chemical additions to DSTs were reviewed to aid in the hazard evaluation. 
The hazard analyses included a multi-disciplinary team that systematically evaluated the addition 
of sodium hydroxide in SST 241-S-112 to identify any hazards that could have a potential 
adverse effect on people or the environment, and energy sources that are present which could 
potentially contribute to the release of material at risk. The attendance roster is included in 
Attachment F1 to document the presence of each team member. 
Based on the hazard analyses, a “delta HAZOP” technique with elements of the “what- 
iii‘checklist” was selected to identify possible impacts on the DSA hazard and accident analyses. 
This technique uses the.accidents analyzed in the DSA as “study nodes” and the systedprocess 
characteristics of the DSA analyses as “process parameters.” The DSA representative and 
candidate accidents were used to assist in identifying unique conditions and formulating new, 
unique, hazardous conditions. 
The application of the graded approach results in hazardous condition screening taking place in 
two phases. Only postdated hazards that meet at least one of the following criteria are captured 
for the second phase of screening. 
The activity related hazard is new or has significant differences from the DSA. 
The activity involves equipment and system configurations significantly different from 
those addressed in the DSA. 
This significantly reduces resource expenditures on hazardshazardous conditions already 
evaluated in the DSA. 
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In the second phase of screening, these hazardous conditions are evaluated to determine if they 
potentially (1) are not represented by a DSA representative or candidate accident analysis, (2) are 
similar to but not bounded by a DSA representative or candidate accident analysis, or (3) are 
similar to and bounded by a DSA representative or candidate accident analysis but require new 
or modified controls. Hazardous conditions that meet one or more of these criteria undergo 
further detailed evaluation (e.g., hazard evaluation and accident analysis). Only those hazardous 
conditions that are found to meet the screening criteria after further evaluation are incorporated 
into the DSA hazard evaluation database (see Attachment F2). 
DSA representative and candidate accidents are described in DSA Sections 3.3.2.3.1, 3.3.2.4.1 
through 3.3.2.4.17, and 3.4.2.1 through 3.4.2.7. As aresult of the hazard analysis, it was 
identified that the Flammable Gas (Sections 3.3.2.4.1 and 3.4.2.1) representative accident and 
Mixing of Incompatible Materials (Section 3.3.2.4.1 1 and 3.4.2.3) representative accident require 
further evaluation as described in Section 4.0. No candidate accidents required further 
evaluation. 
Other DSA accidents that are not applicable, not impacted, or that remain bounding are those 
that : 
e Do not occur within 100-series SSTs (Le., occurs aboveground, in contaminated soil or 
plumes, or within DSTs only) and thus are not affected by the addition of sodium 
hydroxide to SSTs to support waste retrieval (Transportation Accidents 
[Section 3.3.2.3.11, Aboveground Tank Failure [Section 3.3.2.3.11, Large Fire Involving 
Aboveground Tanmessel [Section 3.3.2.3.1]), Evaporator Dump [Section 3.3.2.3.11, 
Steam Intrusion from Interfacing Systems [Section 3.3.2.3.1 1, and Unplanned 
ExcavatiodDrilling [Sections 3.3.2.4.15 and 3.4.2.51). 
May occur in 1 00-series SSTs, but the accident topography, critical assumptions, 'and 
control strategies are not affected by the addition of sodium hydroxide to SSTs to support 
waste retrieval (Organic Solvent Fire [Section 3.3.2.3.11, Filtration Failures Leading to 
Unfiltered Releases [Section 3.3.2.3.11, Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads 
[Sections 3.3.2.4.6 and 3.4.2.21). 
May occur in 100-series SSTs, but the vacuum retrieval system is not being used with the 
addition of sodium hydroxide to support waste retrieval (Vacuum Exhaust Line Rupture 
[Section 3.3.2.4.31). 
May occur in associated waste transfer systems and structures, but the accident 
topography, critical assumptions, and control strategies are not affected by the addition of 
sodium hydroxide to SSTs to support waste retrieval (Release from Contaminated 
Facility [Section 3.3.2.4.41 and Waste Transfer Leaks [Sections 3.3.2.4.13 and 3.4.2.41). 
May occur when withdrawing equipment from SSTs, but the accident topography, critical 
assumptions, and control strategies are not affected by the addition of sodium hydroxide 
to SSTs to support waste retrieval (Aboveground Structure Failure [Section 3.3.2.4.1 01). 
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0 May initiate previously postulated accidents (e.g., waste transfer leak accidents, tank 
failure due to excessive load accidents, flammable gas accidents) but are otherwise 
unaffected by the addition of sodium hydroxide to SSTs to support waste retrieval 
(External Events [Sections 3.3.2.4.16 and 3.4.2.61 and Natural Events 
[Sections 3.3.2.4.17 and 3.4.2.71). 
Are not credible in SSTs and the addition of sodium hydroxide to SSTs to support waste 
retrieval does not create conditions that would make the accident credible (Tank Bump 
[Sections 3.3.2.3.11). 
Remain bounded by the DSA description as analyzed by the nuclear criticality safety 
program (Nuclear Criticality [Section 3.3.2.4.21). 
0 
A DSA accident analysis source term evaluation was also performed that concluded that the 
addition of sodium hydroxide to SSTs to support waste retrieval is bounded by existing source 
terms used in these accident analyses. 
F4.0 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
F4.1 FLAMMABLE GAS ACCIDENT 
F4.1.1 DSA Representative Accidents 
The related DSA representative accident is 01 (Candidate Accident 04/05), Flammable Gas 
Accidents. The technical basis for the flammable gas analysis is summarized in DSA 
Section 3.3.2.4.1, “Flammable Gas Accidents.” 
F4.1.2 Hazardous Conditions 
The hazard analysis postulated that chemical additions to SSTs could affect the flammable gas 
accidents. Results of the evaluation show that the addition of sodium hydroxide to an SST has 
no affect on the frequency or consequences ofthe accidents nor does it have an affect on the TSR 
controls. However, the implementation of the TSR controls for AC 5.10, “Flammable Gas 
Controls,” needs to be expanded to include chemical additions to SSTs @e., SST waste group 
evaluations to determine the applicability of spontaneous and induced gas release hazard 
controls; and SST time to LFL determinations). (Note: The control for waste gel prevention did 
not require revision to encompass chemical additions to SSTs.) 
F4.1.3 Conclusions 
The chemical additions of sodium hydroxide to 100-series SSTs to support waste retrieval are 
bounded by the current hazard and accident analyses and controls for flammable gas accidents. 
Implementation of the flammable gas controls, however, is required to be expanded to include 
chemical additions to SSTs. 
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F4.2 MIXING OF INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS 
F4.2.1 DSA Representative Accidents 
The related DSA representative accident is 11 (candidate accidents 03 and 23), Mixing of 
Incompatible Materials. The technical basis for the mixing of incompatible materials analysis is 
summarized in DSA Section 3.3.2.4.1 1, “Mixing of Incompatible Materials.” 
P4.2.2 Hazardous Conditions 
The hazard analysis postulated that the mixing of incompatible material in a waste tank could 
result in a chemical reaction that produces aerosols and enough internal pressure to expel 
headspace gases, vapors, and aerosolized waste. Bulk chemical additions to DSTs are already 
analyzed in RPP-9689, Ofsite Radiological Consequence Calculation for the Bounding Mixing 
of Incompatible Materials Accident, and RPP-12646, Mixing of Incompatible Materials in Waste 
Tanks Technical Basis Document. The frequency of this postulated accident remains “unlikely.” 
However, it was identified that the source term for the consequence calculations needed to be 
evaluated to include SSTs. Results of this analysis as documented in RPP-12646 show that the 
onsite radiological and toxicological consequences remain “moderate” while the offsite 
toxicological consequences remain “low” for 100-series SSTs. 
F4.2.3 Conclusions 
The chemical additions of sodium hydroxide to 100-series SSTs to support waste retrieval are 
bounded by the current hazard and accident analyses. However, the TSR AC 5.13, “Bulk 
Chemical Controls,” needs to be revised to include 100-series SSTs. 
F5.0 CONTROLS 
Based on the identification and evaluation of potential hazardous conditions for the addition of 
sodium hydroxide to SSTs to support waste retrieval, no new accidents were identified. 
However, the existing DSA hazard and accident analyses for the flammable gas and mixing of 
incompatible materials representative accidents were identified as needing to be revised. 
Revisions to these accidents require the implementation of TSR AC 5.10, “Flammable Gas 
Contro1s,’’ and AC 5.13, “Bulk Chemical Controk,” be expanded to include 100-series SSTs to 
allow the addition o f  sodium hydroxide to SSTs in support of waste retrieval. 
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APPENDIX G 
PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS 
CHECKLIST FORTECHNICAL PEER REVIEW 
Document Reviewed: RPP-I 7965, Safety Evaluation offhe Single-Shell Tank Modified 
Sluicing Waste Retrieval Syste-4 Rev. 5 
Scope of Review (e.g., document section or portion of calculation): Revision 5. 
Yes No NA* 
[XI [ I  [ 1 
[XI [ I  r 1 
1. Previous reviews are complete and cover the analysis, up to the scope of this 
review, with no gaps. 
2. Problem is completely defmed. 
3. Accident scenarios are developed in a clear and logical manner. 
4. Analytical and tecbnical approaches and results are reasonable and 
appropriate. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.8) 
5 .  Necessary assumptions are reasonable, explicitly stated, and supported. 
(ORP QAPP criferion 2.2) 
6.  Computer codes and data files are documented. 
7. Data used in calculations are explicitly stated. 
8. Bases for calculations, including assumptions and data, are consistent with 
the supported safety basis document (e.g., the Tank Farms Final Safety 
Analysis Report). 
9. Data were checked for consistency with original source in€ormation as 
applicable. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.9) 
10. For both qualitative and quantitative data, uncertainties are recognized and 
discussed, as appropriate. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.17) 
1 I. Mathematical derivations were checked including dimensional consistency of 
results. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.16) 
12. Models a n  appropriate and were used within their established range of 
validity or adequate justification was provided for use outside their 
established range of validity. 
13. Spreadsheet results and all hand calculations were verified. 
14. Calculations are sufficiently detailed such that a technically qualified person 
can understand the analysis without requiring outside information. (ORP 
QAPP criterion 2.5) 
15. Software input is corect and consistent with the document reviewed. 
16. Software outpa is consistent with the input and with the results reported in 
the document reviewed. 
17. Software verification and validation are addressed adequateiy. (ORP QAPP 
criterion 2.6) 
t8. timitsfcriterialguidelines applied to the analysis results are appropriate and 
referenced. Limits/c~iteridguidelines were checked against references. 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2.9) 
19. Safety margins are consistent with good engineering practices. 
20. Conclusions are consistent with analytical results and applicable limits. 
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21. Results and conclusions address all points in the purpose. (UP QAPP 
22. All references cited in the text, figures, and tables are contained in the 
23. Reference citations (e.&, title and number) are consistent between the text 
24. Only released (is., not draft) references are cited. (ORP Q4PP oirerion 2.1) 
25. Referenced documents are retrievable or otherwise available. 
26. The most recent version of each reference is cited, as appropriate. 
27. There are no duplicate citations in the reference l i .  
28. Referenced documents are spelled out (title and number) the first time they 
29. All acronyms are spelled out the first time they are used. 
30. The Table of Contents is correct. 
31. All figure, table, and section callouts are correct. 
32. Unit conversions are correct and consistent. 
33. The number of significant digits is appropriate and consistent. 
34. Chemical reactions are correct and balanced. 
35. All tables are formatted consistently and are free of blank cells. 
36. The document is complete (pages, attachments, and appendices) and in the 
37. The document is free of typographid mrs. 
38. The tables are internally consistent. 
39. The document was prepared in accordance with KNF-2353, Section 4.3, 
Attachment B, "CaIculation Note Format and Preparation Inmtions".  
40. Impacted documents are appropriately identified in Blocks 7 and 24 ofthe 
Engineering Change Notice (form A-6003-563.1). 
41. If more than one Technical Peer Reviewer was designated for this document, 
an overall review of the entire document was performed after resolution of all 
Technical Peer Review comments and confirmed that the document is self- 
criterion 2.3) 
reference list. 
callout and the reference list. 
(OW QAPP criterion 2. I )  
are cited. 
proper order. 
C o n c u r & - - "  consistent and complete. 
ce J. Kripps 
( L - 3  C/ td66 
- 
Reviewer (Printed Name and Signature) Date 
* If No or NA is chosen, provide an explanation on this form. 
RF'P-I 7965, Rev. 5, did not use any computer codeq data files, or spreadsheets; did not 
contain any calculatioos, mathematical derivations, or models: and did not state any chemical 
reactions. 
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Document Reviewed: RPP- 17965, Safety Evaluation of the Single-Shell Tanks Modified Sluicing 
Waste Retr iad  System, Rev. 5 
Scope of Review (e.g., document section or portion of calculation): Technical edit 
Yes No NA* 
[ ] [ ] [x] I .  Previous reviews are complete and cover the analysis, up to the scope of this 
[ 1 [ 1 {XI 2. Problem is  completely defined. 
[ ] [ ] [x] 3. Accident scenarios are developed in a clear and logical manner. 
[ ] [ 3 [XI 4. Analytical and technical approaches and results ate reasonable and 
appropriate. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.8) 
[ 3 [ 3 [XI 5. Necessary assumptions are reasonable, explicitly stated, and supported. 
(OW QAPP critm'on 2.2) 
[ ] [ 3 [XI 6. Computer codes and data files are documented. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 7. Data used in calcuIations are explicitly stated. 
[ ] [ ] [XI 8. Bases for calculations, including assumptions and data, are consistent with 
review, with no gaps. 
the supported safety basis document (e.g.. the Tank Farms Final Safety 
Analysis Report). 
[ J [ ] 1x1 9. Data were checked for consistency with original source information as 
applicable. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.9) 
[ 1 [ ] [XI 
discussed, as appropriate. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.17) 
[ ] [ ] [XI 1 I. Mathematical derivations were checked including dimensional consistency of 
results. (ORP QAPP crirerion 2 16) 
[ ] [ ] [XI 12. Models are appropriate and were used within their established range of 
validity or adequate justification was provided for use outside their 
established range of validity. 
10. For both qualitative and quantitative data, uncertainties are recognized and 
[ J [ ] [XI 13. Spreadsheet results and all hand calculations were verified. 
f J [ ] [XI 14. Calculations are sufficiently detailed such that a technically qualified pmon 
can understand the analysis without requiring outside information. (ORP 
QAPP criterion 2.5) 
[ ] [ J [XI 
1 1 [ ] [XI 
[ ] [ ] [x] 17. Software verification and validation are addressed adequately. (ORP QAPP 
[ ] [ ] [XI 18. Limils/criteria/guidelines applied to the analysis results ate appropriate and 
15. S o h a r e  input is correct and consistent with the document reviewed. 
16. Software output is consistent with the input and with the results reported in 
the document reviewed. 
criterion 2.6) 
referenced. Limits/criteria/guidelines were checked against references. 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2.9) 
] [ ] [XI 19. Safety margins ate consistent with good engineering practices. 
[ 3 [ ] [x] 20. Conclusions are consistent with analytical results and applicable 
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[ ] [ ] [XI 
[XI [ ] [ ] 
[x] [ ] [ ] 
[XI [ ] [ ] [XI [ J [ ] 25. Referenced documents are retrievable OT otherwise available. 
[XI [ J [ ] 
[XI [ J [ J 27. There are no duplicate citations in the reference list. 
[XI [ J [ ] 
21. Results and conclusions address all points in the purpose. [ORP QAPP 
22. All references cited in the text, figures, and tables are contained in the 
23. Reference citations (e&, title and number) are consistent between the text 
24. Only released (Le., not draft) references are cited. (ORP QAPP criterion 2.1) 
26. The most recent version ofeach reference is cited, as appropriate. 
criterion 2.3) 
reference list. 
callout and the reference list. 
(ORP QAPP criterion 2. I )  
28. Referenced documents are spelled out (title and number) the first time they 
are cited. 
] [ ] 
] [ ] 30. The Table ofcontents is correct. 
] [ ] 
J [ ] 32. Unit conversions are correct and consistent. 
J [ J 
] [XI 34. Chemical reactions are correct and balanced. 
J [ ] 
] [ 1 
29. All acronyms are spelled out the first time they are used. 
31. All figure, table, and section callouts are correct. 
33. The number of significant digits is appropriate and consistent 
35. All tables are formatted consistently and are free ofblank cells. 
36. The document is complete (pages, attachments, and appendices) and m the 
proper order. 
[XI [ ] [ J 
[XI [ 1 [ ] 38. The tables areintemally consistent. 
[XI [ 1 [ ] 
[ J [ ] [x] 
[XI [ 1 [I 
37. The document is free oftypographical errors. 
39. The document was prepared in accordance with “F-2353, Section 4.3, 
Attachment B, “Calculation Note Format and Prepmation Instructions”. 
40. Impacted documents are appmpriateIy identified in Blocks 7 and 24 of the 
Engineering Change Notice (form A-6003-563. I). 
41. if more than one Technical Peer Reviewer was designated for this document, 
an overall review of the entire document was performed after resolution of all 
Technical Peer Review comments and confirmed that the document is self- 
consistent and complete, 
Ixl I1 f l  Concorrence 
o x - / b - ~  b 
Date 
Lmna Germain 
Reviewer (Printed Name and Signature) 
* If No or NA is chosen, provide an explanation on this form. 
Technical Edit 
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